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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses social system equilibrium theory to answer the question how 
terrorism works.  Counterterrorism policy can benefit from a systems analysis of both 
terrorist groups and targeted social systems.  Current terrorism theory does not 
adequately address the broad question of how terrorism causes political-social change 
and is thus of limited use to counter strategic terrorist objectives.  This thesis proposes the 
Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism (DETT) as a social systems framework for 
understanding how terrorism causes change.  The social system is examined as a complex 
living system composed of two primary components; value and environment.  These two 
components exist in dynamic equilibrium, a homeostatic process of balance which 
functions to keep the system operating within normal parameters.  When these 
components are out of balance, changes occur within the system.  If the value-
environment relationship is significantly out of balance, the system may enter 
disequilibrium, characterized by dysfunction and a high likelihood of violence. 
Terrorism is a unique political weapon because it targets a social system’s 
equilibrium in order to force change.  It is a violent environmental input at immediate and 
recognizable odds with a system’s value and as such disrupts the value-environment 
equilibrium.  The DETT theory offered in this thesis is used to examine Al Qaeda and the 
attacks of 9/11.  Theses attacks were a terrorist input that disrupted our social system 
equilibrium and forced changes.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
In the spring of 1999, Kalied Shaikh Mohammed and Osama Bin Laden met to 
plot the next phase of their terror campaign against America.  During this Kandahar 
meeting, they discussed specific tactics to achieve their strategic objectives and planned 
the attacks that would eventually take place on September 11, 2001.1  Two and a half 
years after that spring meeting, the ideas discussed would successfully materialize into a 
tremendous blow against America.  These attacks would shock and confound the World’s 
most dominant power.  The events of that day had many profound impacts on us as a 
society.   
The multi pronged Al Qaeda attack on 9/11 resulted in 3,043 deaths.  Although 
the real cost will never be definitively known, some experts assess the economic impact 
of 9/11 as $82.8-$94.8 billion in New York City alone.2  Al Qaeda actions leading up to 
September 11, 2001 are now well documented and the physical destruction has been 
cleared.  Al Qaeda planning and the method of the actual attacks have been extensively 
studied.  Our post 9/11 analysis has resulted in a deeper understanding of both Osama Bin 
Laden and Al Qaeda.  Beyond the casualties and financial loss, that attack impacted our 
society in dramatic ways but do we fully understand the true long term impact of 9/11 on 
our society?  How did this terrorism impact our society?  This thesis will argue that Al 
Qaeda’s attack of 9/11 impacted our society in many, yet unstudied ways that are also 
important to our theoretical understanding how terrorism works. 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2004), 155. 
2 Comptroller City of New York, One Year Later, The Fiscal Impact of 9/11, (New York, 2002),  
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/reports/impact-9-11-year-later.pdf. (last accessed 1 July 
2007).  
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The counterterrorism community is rightfully focused on how the attacks 
occurred but the academic and policy community should likewise be concerned with how 
terrorism influences strategic change.  Law enforcement, intelligence, and military 
professionals need to understand how and why Al Qaeda operates so that they can better 
protect us against future attacks.  The academic and policy community should understand 
how terrorism forced change in American society so that we can control the pace and 
types of changes in our own society.  America must retain the ability to shape our own 
future and not relinquish this power to outside forces.  This thesis will build upon existing 
terrorism and systems theories to propose the Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism 
(DETT) to explain how terrorism works.  This new theory can be used as a mental model 
to better understand the impacts of terrorism like 9/11 on society.   
9/11 was a wake-up call for the nation.  It alerted us to a threat that had been 
attacking us for many years.  On that infamous day, Al Qaeda finally got our attention.  
Even for most experts in government and academia, the enemy was relatively unknown 
and wholly underestimated.  Since the attacks, we quickly learned that our enemy was 
cunning, ruthless, and in some ways brilliant.  They are brilliant in their ingenuity, 
tenacity, and strategic focus.  We need to respond with equal strategic brilliance.   
Our understanding of Al Qaeda as an organization and ideology is significantly 
better today but we still do not understand the underlying question of how terrorism 
works.  Our tactical and operational counterterrorism efforts have been successful at 
targeting specific terrorist groups but our long term efforts to neutralize the use of 
terrorism have not been as productive.  Only once we understand the broad theoretical 
problem of terrorism can we begin to defeat it or mitigate its use in a meaningful strategic 
way.   
Some experts would argue that eliminating terrorism is an impossible goal and we 
should simply suffer its existence.  To this argument, this thesis offers some historical 
examples of tactics or strategies once considered insurmountable.  Civilian cities were 
once encircled and starved into submission.  This is not a particularly useful or practiced 
operation or strategy today.  Air to air dogfights, once the raison d'être for aircraft, are all 
but obsolete except for recruiting purposes and useless in the face of long range sensors 
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and weapons.    Human piloted aircraft are sure to follow this trend over the next twenty 
years.  Nuclear weapons, the most potent weapons we own, have not been unleashed in 
over 50 years.  The simple point in these examples is that these once seemingly 
unconquerable tactics or dominant strategies were made ineffective and thus irrelevant.  
The defeat of these tactics was not achieved by destroying fighter aircraft or dismantling 
nuclear warheads, these problems were solved by international conventions, technology 
that bred irrelevance, or simply the unwillingness of a society to pull the trigger.  
Solutions are not immediately obvious but come with time, effort, tenacity, and a dash of 
brilliance.  Simply accepting terrorism is not particularly brilliant and acts as an 
impediment to potential solutions.  Terrorism in one form or another has existed 
throughout modern human history but its use can be rendered ineffective and thus 
irrelevant.  As we enter the seventh year of our “long war,” new approaches to terrorism 
and Al Qaeda are critical to the future stability of our nation.3   The dynamic equilibrium 
theory of terrorism that is presented throughout this thesis is a step towards that objective.        
Prior to 9/11 we considered a domestic attack of that magnitude impossible.  As a 
society, we considered ourselves safe from this type of assault.  When the attack 
occurred, we were shocked to find a disparity between the worlds we lived in and how 
we thought that world should be.  The attack and the shock that followed, spurred change 
in the American social system.  As a minimum, the attacks caused us to question our 
historically unchallenged domestic security but in the extreme, we may be a 
fundamentally different society.  We know that change has occurred but need to better 
understand how terrorism really impacts us.  This thesis will provide a possible 
explanation as to how terrorism forces change in social systems.   
The answer to this thesis’ primary question is rooted in well established social 
systems theory, that as of yet, has not been adequately applied to understanding how 
terrorism works.  These existing theories are the basis for the social system dynamic 
equilibrium theory of terrorism, or DETT, introduced in this thesis.  DETT is intended as 
                                                 
3 The term “long war” was coined by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a 2006 QDR speech 
discussing the long tern, “generational” nature of the global war on terrorism.   
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an analytical framework which will argue terrorism is a unique political weapon because 
it targets a social system’s equilibrium in order to force change. 
Even a great theory will not stop terrorism.  It must be applied through policy to 
have an impact.  Therefore, the goal of this paper is not only to theorize but also to 
operationalize these ideas.  Al Qaeda still presents a significant threat to the United States 
and is thus the most relevant case study for analysis.  This thesis will use DETT to 
examine the impact of Al Qaeda and 9/11 on the American system.        
Al Qaeda is not just a terrorist group.  It is the vanguard of a global Islamist 
insurgency.4  It is a violent political system focused on long term change.  It is a 
predatory system composed thinkers, leaders, fighters, suppliers, financiers, trainers, and 
recruiters who all function around a core ideology in pursuit of a central purpose.  
Members and supporters are the elements of this violent system.  These components may 
not know each other, may not be located in the same country, nor even speak the same 
language but they all form a system that functions towards an objective.  To attack this Al 
Qaeda system, we should understand both its structure and how its components function.  
Their violent outputs are not random or arbitrary.  They are focused on achieving long 
term goals.  Al Qaeda’s goals are social-religious change and they are willing to kill or be 
killed to achieve it.   
Terrorism is perceived by Al Qaeda to be an effective weapon.  On 9/11 the 
terrorists successfully struck three of their four targets but these were not their ultimate 
objective.  Al Qaeda’s physical attacks are observable tactical events but are intended to 
further a much larger strategic objective.  Their objective is to force change in our social-
political system.  To achieve victory against our superior military force, they must avoid 
concentration, use whatever weapons are available, and leverage whatever tactics are 
effective.  Terrorism is their predominant tactic to achieve this.  They hope that terrorist 
acts against the American system will result in our withdrawal militarily, economically, 
and socially from the Middle East.  If they are successful, they expect to seize power and 
                                                 
4 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Virginia: Potomac 
Books, 2004), 66.  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 198.  
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impose their own political-religious standards on the Middle East.  This is their 
immediate objectives but not their ultimate goal.  Al Qaeda documents provide stunning 
evidence that once they achieve their regional objectives in the Middle East, they intend 
to continue the violent struggle until global Salafist rule is imposed.  Our success against 
this enemy must be total and to do so we need to neutralize their most effective tactic, 
terrorism.     
Since 9/11, our nation has responded forcefully and with resolve.  The global war 
on terrorism led us to Afghanistan, the Philippines, central Asia, and now Iraq.  The 
changes made to homeland security are monumental and our policies are much improved.  
Our initiatives have been operationally effective but may be strategically inefficient.  The 
expense in American dollars and lives has been large and is growing.  As the expense 
grows and the war continues, we must consider more efficient means of success.  Despite 
our efforts, some argue we have exacerbated the terrorist problem, not solved it.5  Islamic 
insurgencies have shown signs of growth in Somalia, Kenya, West Africa, Indonesian, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Central Asia.6  Our invasion of 
Afghanistan temporarily disrupted terrorist operations, logistics, and training but has not 
eliminated the threat or stymied the use of terrorism by our opponents.  After all the 
effort and expense (in human and financial costs) after 9/11, groups like Al Qaeda still 
choose terrorism because it appears to work.  We cannot fully exploit our tactical and 
operational counterterrorism successes until we understand the strategic how and why of 
terrorism.  It should be a national security imperative.             
To understand terrorism this thesis is founded on the position that a synthesis of 
systems, sociology, and terrorism theory is needed.  By taking a systems approach, we 
can better understand how a society reacts to terrorism which is ultimately the key to 
understanding how terrorism works.  This thesis will introduce the dynamic equilibrium 
theory of terrorism as a step towards this understanding and a more efficient way forward 
in the global war on terror.  It could advance our theoretical understanding of terrorism 
                                                 
5 Scheuer, 139. 
6 Scheuer, 139. 
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and thus improve our long term policy.    The following section will examine the research 
overview, objectives, and overall organization of this thesis. 
B. RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
1. Overview:  Terrorism is a weapon that attacks society in a unique way.  The 
impact of 9/11 goes far beyond the physical destruction.  This thesis will explore how 
terrorism impacts both individuals and societies in profound ways that other acts of 
political violence or coercion do not.  Since social-political change is the terrorists’ 
objective, understanding how change occurs within societies is pivotal to our 
understanding of how terrorism works.   
To research this complex issue, terrorist groups and targeted societies will be 
analyzed as systems.  As systems, both their structure and how their components function 
with one another determine how they operate.  When examining systems such as Al 
Qaeda and specific social systems, we need to understand how their components interact.  
Just understanding the parts of Al Qaeda is important but does not lead to a complete 
understanding of how they operate.  For example, we may have perfect clarity on who the 
Al Qaeda financiers are but if we do not understand how they raise and transfer funds 
then our understanding of the total finances of Al Qaeda are still limited.  Not until we 
understand Al Qaeda’s dynamics or how those pieces of the group function with one 
another can we begin to fully understand the total system.  This same principle applies to 
social systems.  We know what geography, ethnicities, religions, and demographics make 
up America but this does not explain America until we understand how the whole system 
operates.   To help us understand how these specific systems operate, we can apply some 
general systems principles.     
To explain how terrorism works, this thesis will analyze society as a complex 
living system.  Systems like Al Qaeda and the American social system share common 
characteristics.  This thesis will use the characteristics of general and living systems in 
order to understand how terrorist groups impact their targeted social system.   
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One common system characteristics is a tendency to maintain a steady state 
balance of forces which keep it functioning normally.  We see this principle at work all 
around us.  Every system reaches some balance of various forces that allows it to operate.  
This balance does not equate a status quo and is a dynamic changing process.  Each 
system reaches this unique balance based on its unique structure, dynamics, and 
objectives.  Within the Al Qaeda organization, a balance of finances, recruiting, and 
leadership is necessary.  An imbalance of any one of these components can disrupt the 
system so targeting this balance can be an effective combating terrorism strategy.  For 
example, perhaps we cannot effectively target terrorist bombers so we choose to target all 
the financial components of their system.  If successful, we create an imbalance in their 
system which results in sub optimal Al Qaeda performance.  To survive, Al Qaeda must 
make changes to compensate.  This may result in new finance methods or changes in 
operations that require less funding.  The total system is forced into change in an effort to 
restore a new, but functioning equilibrium of forces/components.  This same principle is 
at work within social systems. 
Societies are very complex systems.  The number of components that must be 
simultaneously balanced is infinite compared to a simpler system such as Al Qaeda.  
Although these different types of systems vary in complexity, they still share similar 
characteristics.  Social systems are also subject to this balance of forces or property of 
dynamic equilibrium.7  A disruption in that system’s equilibrium can result in system 
changes.  Theories of social disequilibrium have been used to understand revolution but 
this thesis will specifically examine how terrorism helps induce an imbalance of social 
forces.  It is this social system characteristic of dynamic equilibrium that terrorism 
targets.      
Terrorism works by attacking this balance of forces.  Understanding the social 
system in question, its properties, and its parameters of dynamic equilibrium can assist us 
in developing policy that will keep the system operating efficiently.  Analyzing terrorist 
                                                 
7 Later in this thesis, the terms equilibrium, dynamic equilibrium, homeostasis, and steady state will be 
explained in greater detail.  Different fields of research use these terms differently, often to explain the 
same general principle. 
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groups and societies as systems is necessary to explain how terrorism works as a tool of 
social change.  This thesis will propose the dynamic equilibrium theory of terrorism as a 
useful model to explain how terrorism works. 
Once this thesis explains how terrorism works to effect social change, it will 
examine the impact of 9/11 on the American system.  America will be divided into the 
economic, government, and national security sub components for analysis.  Data will 
then be compared pre 9/11, immediately after 9/11, and a few years after 9/11 in an effort 
to chart the general impact of Al Qaeda’s attacks on our system.   
The study of terrorism and social systems are both incredibly complex endeavors.  
Sub categories of either one of these topics could (and do) consume a lifetime of 
academic study.  Four fundamental research propositions were used guide this research 
and analysis.     
C.  RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
Ultimately, the central question of this thesis is how terrorism works.  The 
following four propositions were used to research and analyze this critical question. 
1.  The social system is an open system, open to exogenous and endogenous 
inputs which can be regulated to maintain normal system operations.  
Terrorism is an input to the system that cannot always be stopped but its 
impact on the system can be managed by controlling the system’s 
response.  
2.  The social system strives for homeostatic, dynamic equilibrium which can 
be purposefully disrupted to create significant system perturbations.  
Terrorism works because it attacks this equilibrium, causing some degree 
of disequilibrium which in turn can result in change to the social system.   
3. The social system consists of two basic elements; value and environment.  
The dynamic balance of these elements drives change within the social 
system and is fundamental to our understanding of how terrorism forces 
changes in some systems but not others.  When change does not restore 
value-environment balance, pressure can build.  Increased system pressure 
may result in increased dysfunction and more radical social change.       
4.  Terrorism is a system input intended to disrupt the value to environment 
balance and thus force change within the social system.  The effectiveness 
and efficiency of counterterrorism policy can be improved with a deeper 
understanding of these social system dynamics.   
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Each of these propositions was used to formulate DETT as a useful mental model.   
Due to the complexity of this research question, the structure of this paper is important to 
guide the reader through the research process and the development of a new terrorism 
theory.  The organization of this thesis is as follows.    
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is structured into five chapters.  Chapter I has introduced the general 
purpose, research propositions, and will now discuss this thesis’ organization.  Overall, it 
is organized to first explore a significant amount of previous work on the subject and then 
tread new theoretical ground.  Finally, it conducts a modest test of these ideas using the 
attacks of 9/11.     
Chapter II of this thesis will explain the methodology used and review the 
literature available to support this thesis’ argument.  Theories from various specialties 
will be synthesized to establish the dynamic equilibrium theory of terrorism.  Chapter II 
includes a review of systems theory, social systems theory, and relevant terrorism theory.   
Chapter III will review three theories of social change and explain in detail why 
equilibrium theory is the most relevant to how terrorism works.  Although the initial 
relevance to terrorism may be unclear, these concepts are important to our understanding 
of how social systems operate and thus how they change.  The theoretical background 
analyzed in Chapter III becomes the foundation for the development of DETT.       
Chapter IV of this thesis will guide the reader through DETT.  It will first 
describe the components and dynamic processes of a social system.  Understanding the 
social system is required to determine how it will react to inputs of terrorism.  Once the 
process of social change is clear, Chapter IV examines how terrorism acts as a catalyst 
for change.   The roles of governments and external agents will be examined to determine 
the implications on future counterterrorism development.  By the conclusion of this 
chapter, DETT will be established for use to analyze 9/11.  
Chapter V will use the DETT to examine the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11.  The 
American social system will be divided into economic, government, and national security 
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subcomponents for analysis.  Each one of these subcomponents will be examined to 
determine the change that has occurred as a result of 9/11.  Each one of these sub 
component equilibriums will then be combined to determine overall system equilibrium, 
system changes, and thus the impact of 9/11.    
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II. METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW     
A.  OVERVIEW 
This chapter will explain the methodology and existing literature used in this 
thesis.  Methodology is the process used to research, analyze, and draw conclusions.  The 
literature review is important to highlight existing work in various fields relevant to this 
thesis.  Upon conclusion of this chapter, the reader should understand the methodological 
process, systems concepts, basic social systems theory, and terrorism theories used 
throughout this paper.                   
B. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH     
The methodology used in this thesis is a systems dynamics approach to the study 
of terrorism and its impact on society.  To understand the impact of terrorism on society 
we first have to understand both as systems.   
This thesis is not focused on a specific characteristic or definitional element of 
terrorism.  It is focused on the broader phenomena of terrorism.  This literature review 
will examine some definitions, elements, and general terrorism theories only as a 
background to frame the rest of this thesis.  A “systems dynamics” approach was adopted 
to analyze two diverse and very complex themes; terrorism and society.   
A research design process was used to guide the research and analysis.  This 
design included seven steps.  These steps were; describe the problem, describe the 
systems at work, identify major elements of the system, postulate the system’s structure 
and dynamics, develop a theory/model, evaluate the model, and finally to communicate 
the results and conclusions.8     
 
                                                 
8 These eight steps are a modified version of the nine “steps in modeling process” presented by 
Professor Thomas H. Johnson, during course NS4805 Modeling Terrorism: New Analytical Approaches, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Summer 2007. 
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1.   Describe the problem: The problem is discussed at length in Chapter I.  
In summary, our counterterrorism policy can be improved by a more thorough 
understanding of how terrorism works and thus why it is chosen as a tool for social 
change.  Current terrorism theory is useful but does not adequately address the systemic  
impact of terrorism on society.  This thesis intends to research, analyze, and synthesize 
several theories to establish a new theory of how terrorism works.  This thesis will 
propose and test the Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism (DETT). 
2.   Describe the systems at work: To determine how terrorism works, it was 
first necessary to understand the social system targeted by terrorism.  This is the 
uniqueness of this thesis.  It attempts to analyze terrorism as an output from one system 
and then an input to another.  To do this, society and terrorist groups are both examined 
as systems.  This chapter will spend some time reviewing systems theory and the 
characteristics of living systems.   
3.   Identify major elements of the system: Each system’s structure has 
significant impact on how it functions.  It is therefore important to first define boundaries 
of the system in question.  Once the system is bound, than the individual components and 
sub systems can be identified.   
4.   Postulate the system’s structure and dynamics:  Past theory is used 
here extensively to posit what the actual social system looks like and how it acts.  This 
paper examines and adopts certain system dynamics critical to our understanding of 
terrorism as a social input.  Specifically, equilibrium theory in social systems and the 
value-environment construct of societies form the theoretical basis of DETT.  Both of 
these system properties will be dealt with at length in Chapter III and IV.     
5.   Develop a theory/model: A model is a simple representation of reality.  A 
good model can help us simulate or at least think critically about real complex systems 
and interactions.  This thesis builds upon existing social system theory, terrorism theory, 
and a simple but eloquent model of revolution put forth by Chalmers Johnson.  These 
ideas are synthesized and expanded upon to derive the Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of 
Terrorism (DETT).  DETT is a mental model that explains how terrorism works.      
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6.  Evaluate model:  DETT is offered to the academic and policy community 
as a useful model with utility for future research and policy development.  The new 
theory will then be used to examine Al Qaeda and the attacks of 9/11.  The model will be 
used to examine how those attacks impacted the American social system.     
7.   Communicate results and conclusions:  The conclusions will summarize 
the findings of this thesis.  Due to the broad scope of this thesis it was not possible to 
explore all the nuances of the subject or deal with all the questions that arose.  Therefore, 
the final chapter also includes some of the important but unanswered questions that 
remain for further research.     
The above seven steps were used to structure this research and analysis.  The 
process began with an extensive literature review.  This literature review provides the 
reader with some of the basic theoretical pillars necessary to support arguments made 
later in this thesis.   
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The following literature review is divided into three major sections; systems 
theory, social system and social change theory, and terrorism.  A review of these three 
disciplines was needed to support the propositions of this thesis.  There are abundant 
publications focused on all of these subjects but few that examined terrorism from a 
sociological perspective.  For various reasons, social theory has not been sufficiently 
applied to help us understand terrorism.  As noted by Bergesen and Lizardo, “At present 
there is little sociology of terrorism, whether in the form of theory or research.”9  If 
terrorism is fundamentally about coercing social-political change, then sociology should 
play a major role in our understanding of it.  This thesis is an attempt to understand 
terrorism as an input into the larger living social system.  Answers to this thesis’ primary 
questions lie in a synthesis of these various disciplines and theories. 
                                                 
9 Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo, “International Terrorism and the World System,” Sociological 
Theory 22 (2004): 38. 
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D.  SYSTEMS THEORY 
 Systems theory is a multidiscipline approach to studying a wide range of complex 
bodies such as living organisms, machines, organizations, and human societies.10  It is 
increasingly becoming a valuable tool in social sciences and can help us understand 
terrorism.  It has been successfully used to study specific conflict and specific 
terrorist/insurgent groups but little existing literature could be found that directly 
examined terrorism as an input to the social system.   
Since systems theory is concerned with how various components and sub systems 
interrelate and operate towards some unifying purpose, we can utilize it to dissect both 
terrorist groups and a targeted society to understand how they function.  This thesis uses a 
systems approach to move beyond the study of individual terrorist groups and examine 
how the input of terrorism impacts our social system.11     
There is significant work which applies general systems principles in the social 
sciences.  Deutsch, Kaplan, Katz, Kahn, McClelland and others have applied systems 
theory to international relations, politics, and organizational behavior which could be 
utilized in our evolving understanding or terrorism.12  Throughout the study of systems, 
certain common characteristics of all systems have been identified.  These common 
characteristics are the first step to understanding specific systems such as Al Qaeda and 
the American social system it targeted on 9/11.    
                                                 
10 The two predominant sources utilized throughout this thesis are Ludwig Von 
Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (New York: George 
Braziler, 1969) and James Grier Miller, Living Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 
11 A deep body of systems theory literature covers many fields of study.  For example, 
see: Kenneth Boulding, “General System Theory—The Skeleton of Science,” General Systems; Yearbook 
of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, (1956).  Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and 
Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962).  C.W Churchman, The Systems Approach (New 
York: Laural, 1968).  E. Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy; Toward a new Paradigm of 
Contemporary Thought (San Francisco: Harper, 1972).     
12 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Communication and Control (New 
York: Free Press, 1963).  Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, “Organizations and the System Concept; The 
Social Psychology of Organizations” in Classics of Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).     
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1.  General Systems Theory.  Ludwig Von Bertalanffy described general 
systems theory as the scientific exploration of “wholeness.”13  Instead of studying 
individual components, systems theory is concerned with studying all the components, 
sub systems, and how they operate together. 
Even simple systems are made-up of many components that serve specific 
purposes.  For example, in Al Qaeda members have specific roles.  They need operatives 
to conduct attacks and leadership to set a strategic direction.  They need recruiters to keep 
an influx of new recruits, financiers, supply personnel, explosive experts and so on.  The 
Al Qaeda system is also composed of training bases, safe houses, weapons, equipment, 
web sites, and even ideology.  All of these components perform specific functions that 
when combined together form a functioning system.   
Al Qaeda outputs a radical political view and violence to achieve its objectives.  If 
the components of Al Qaeda were separated and examined in isolation, you may learn a 
lot about the individual components, but not much about the system as a whole.  No 
individual, computer, operative, or weapon can produce terrorism or spread ideology.  It 
takes several of these components working together.  To understand such complex 
problems, we should study the entire system instead of its individual components.14  For 
example, in counterterrorism, the isolated study of explosives or Osama Bin Laden may 
be useful but does not give us a complete understanding of the terror group.  A more 
holistic, total systems analysis of the problem is required.   
Systems theory is concerned with how these various components and sub systems 
interrelate or function towards some unifying purpose - a system’s dynamics.  Ervin 
Laszlo summarizes this notion in the following way: “complex phenomena proved to be 
more than a simple sum of the properties of isolated causal chains, or of the properties of 
their components taken separately.  Such phenomena must be explained not only in terms 
of their components, but also in regard to the entire set of relations between 
                                                 
13 Bertalanffy, xx. 
14 Bertalanffy, 9. 
 16
components.”15  Systems theory is beneficial to our study of complex, often hidden 
components and sub systems that exist throughout both society and terrorism.  For 
purpose of this thesis, we are primarily concerned with the dynamic relationship between 
the components of a society (bounded as a system) and how the overall system reacts to 
inputs of terrorism.   For example, examining the immediate economic impact of 9/11 is 
important, but it is only a small piece of the larger puzzle.  More telling would be a 9/11 
analysis that studied the long range economic impact on trade, which in turn impacted 
immigration, which further impacted domestic electoral politics.  Because of the 
overwhelmingly complex nature of some systems, general characteristics of systems are 
an important starting point.      
Bertalanffy focused his general systems theory on common laws that could be 
applied to systems across all fields of study, including social systems.  In addition to the 
actual study of general system properties, this approach facilitates a cross flow of 
information or advancements between specializations.  Since advanced studies in 
different academic fields of study are highly specialized, they tend to be studied in 
isolation.  General system theories are a way to bridge the gaps between these various 
fields of study.  This is especially important in bridging the gap between the abstract and 
the concrete studies.  Certain fields of study such as biology and mechanical engineering 
are clearly observable in the physical world while other more abstract fields of study, 
such as sociology or political science are often difficult to observe or prove in a concrete 
way.  Therefore, a systems approach can help us to apply abstract concepts such as 
sociology and terrorism theory to the concrete world.  This approach is known as 
“systems thinking.”16  The first important characteristic of systems that impacts our study 
of terrorism is that they are either open of closed.   
Closed systems are isolated from external or exogenous input.  A closed system 
also outputs nothing.  A perfectly closed system would have to exist in complete isolation 
from any external inputs.  Although it cannot exist in its truest sense, the term is still used 
                                                 
15 Ervin Laszlo, “The Origins of General Systems Theory in the Work of Von Bertalanffy,” in The 
Relevance of General Systems Theory, ed. Ervin  Laszlo (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 5. 
16 Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (Avon: John Wiley and Sons, 1981), 3. 
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to describe relatively closed or isolated systems.  An isolated tribal social system that is 
not influenced by any contact with modern society could be described as a closed social 
system.  Without external stimulus, change may be slow.  Conversely, open systems 
receive inputs from outside the system and are therefore influenced by external factors.  
These external influences may be from the environment or other systems.  The American 
social system is a very open system that is exposed to countless numbers of inputs at any 
given time.  Terrorism is one of these external inputs.    
 
 
Figure 1.   Closed versus Open System 
In reality, our entire world is a highly complex series of interwoven open systems.  
Each open system receives inputs, has internal processes, and sends outputs.  In many 
cases we cannot see or collect data on all of the system’s components and interactions 
which complicate a study of that system.  In this case, models and simulations become 
useful. 
Since open systems are interconnected, we must make an analytical choice as to 
where one system begins and another ends.  One of the first tasks in systems analysis is to 
define the boundaries and identify the system’s various pieces.  For example, if we were 
studying a specific terrorist group, would active supporters be part of our system?  
Perhaps we decide that for purposes of our analysis; terrorist systems are defined only by 
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hard core operators and active supporters are outside the boundaries of the system.  Do 
passive supporters, weapons dealers, money handlers, terrorist family members exist 
within or outside the system?  All these questions are important to defining the 
boundaries of the system.  
2.  Living Systems Theory.  Systems can also be classified as either living or 
non living systems.  James Grier Miller, in his prolific Living Systems puts forth a 
unifying theory of living systems that can be a valuable tool in examining terrorism.  In 
this work, he defines living systems as complex systems that carry out “living 
processes.”17  This not only includes obvious living organisms such as plants and 
animals, but also applies to collective organisms such as terrorist groups, 
counterterrorism organizations, and societies in general.  Miller effectively argues that 
societies are living systems and thus bound by certain living system characteristics.18  
These characteristics become important to our ultimate understanding of terrorism.  
Miller lists nine common characteristics of all living systems of which two are of primary 
concern to this thesis.19   
a.  Open.  All living systems are open.  Since they are open, living systems 
receive inputs, have throughputs (or processes), and outputs.  As discussed above, open 
systems are impacted by and potentially impact their external environment, including 
other systems.  Open systems can be infinitely connected to external systems and 
influences.  Both terrorist groups and social systems are open systems.  They require 
inputs to survive and grow.  Without inputs they die.  It is exactly this necessity for input 
that also makes them vulnerable to outside influence.  A relatively closed social system is 
more secure but not necessarily healthier.  A more open society such as the United States 
is more susceptible to inputs, both beneficial and negative.  Our openness is strength but 
can also be a weakness.      
                                                 
17 Miller, 1. 
18 Miller, 18. 
19 Miller identifies nine characteristics common to all living system in Living Systems, page 18.  
Only Miller’s first two characteristics are specifically mentioned here, as they are central to the remainder 
of this thesis.   
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b.  Steady State.  Living systems must maintain a steady state of productive 
forces that counters the natural break-down and decay of matter.  This inevitable decay of 
all matter is known as entropy.  Based on the laws of thermodynamics, entropy is 
unavoidable and results in an eventual disorganization of matter into nothing.  However, 
entropy in living systems can be countered by negative entropy or negentropy.  This is 
the addition of energy and organization to the system at a rate that exceeds 
disorganization or lost energy (entropy).  A system whose energy gain does not exceed its 
loss is in a state of entropy and will eventually cease to exist.  In the case of living 
systems, if there are no negentropic inputs such as food or water, the system will die.  
Take for example a terrorist group.  To survive, they need negentropic inputs such as new 
recruits or supporters.  Even the best terrorist cannot evade the passage of time and will 
eventually die.  Without new followers, the group will simply cease to exist.  While 
counterterrorism efforts try to slow or stop these positive inputs (recruitment, profits, and 
supplies), they also simultaneously focus on increasing negative energy inputs such as 
killing and capturing the terrorists that already exits. 
According to Miller, it is a characteristic of living systems to naturally achieve a 
“steady state” balance of productive, life sustaining forces to counter entropy.  
Bertalanffy echoes this concept and states that “living systems, maintaining themselves in 
a steady state, can avoid the increase of entropy, and may even develop towards states of 
increased order and organization.”20  This characteristic of living systems to maintain a 
steady state of negentropy is not static.  It is a dynamic process of change.  Change is 
thus a natural and continuous process to counter entropy.  Healthy living systems tend to 
reach a steady or balanced state operation.   
This concept is important to understand our own society.  According to Miller 
societies and terrorist groups are in a constant state of decay but compensate by bringing 
in new resources, ideas, people, etc.  The level of growth needs to exceed the level of 
decay to survive or grow. Conversely, if they grow or change too fast, the society or 
group could be overwhelmed with change without sufficient time to adjust causing 
                                                 
20 Bertalanffy, 41. 
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fragmentation.  The critical point here is that societies have a natural tendency to achieve 
a healthy balance or steady state of all these forces.  When they do not, a society either 
dies or changes too rapidly to adapt.  A balance of forces or equilibrium process is critical 
to normal operations and even the survival of social systems.   
This thesis cannot explore all of Millers’ prolific work but is used here to 
characterize social systems and terrorist groups as open living systems which tend to 
naturally achieve a steady state of forces necessary for survival.  Terrorist groups are 
living systems that exhibit the same characteristics as other living systems.  These 
characteristics can become vulnerabilities if they are recognized and leveraged by 
counterterrorism policy.  Likewise, societies are also living systems who share these 
characteristics which can become vulnerabilities.  Understanding these living system 
characteristics of openness and steady state are important to understanding how terrorism 
works.              
E. SOCIAL SYSTEM AND SOCIAL CHANGE THEORY 
There is a rich body of sociology literature that addresses the composition and 
functioning of social systems.  Chapter III will deal with this subject in more detail but an 
overview is useful at this point.    
1.  Social Change.  Richard Appelbaum’s Theories of Social Change 
provides an excellent overview of conflict theory, evolution theory, and equilibrium 
theory of social change.21  The conflict and evolutionary theories of social change will be 
reviewed and discussed but are not central to this thesis.  Equilibrium theory is critical to 
understanding how terrorism works and as such will be explored in depth.22  The 
equilibrium theory of social change essentially states the same concept as Miller and Von 
Bertalanffy’s “balance of forces.”  The Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism 
(DETT) explained in Chapter IV is grounded in these concepts so a short review of 
equilibrium theory is necessary here.     
                                                 
21 Richard A. Appelbaum, Theories of Social Change (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 
1970), 65-79. 
22 Appelbaum, 15-43, 81-97. 
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2.  Structural-Functionalism.  Systems thinking was used by Emile 
Durkenheim to analyze society before it had been conceived of as a separate field.  
Durkenheim’s structuralism was the genesis for modern structural-functionalism which 
examines societies as systems.  It is Durkenheim’s work that sparked Talcott Parsons’ 
early equilibrium theory and is thus relevant throughout this thesis.  Talcott Parsons is the 
primary sociology source used throughout this thesis.23  Modern sociologists have 
advanced some of these structural-functions principles and developed a newer niche of 
Parsonian theory known as neofunctionalism.  Key authors within neofunctionalism are 
Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy.24  Neofunctionalists such as Gould and Lehman 
believed that Parsons’ original notions of equilibrium were too strict and did not allow for 
structural changes when a system is outside of equilibrium.25  These sociologists have 
established a theoretical foundation for social system equilibrium theory that this thesis 
will use to explain how terrorism leverages dynamic equilibrium to drive changes within 
social systems.   
As in Miller’s notion of steady state, systems such as societies and terrorist groups 
tend to achieve a balance or dynamic equilibrium so they can operate within normal 
parameters.  This dynamic equilibrium hypothesis has been used by past theorists in 
multiple disciplines to explain actions within social systems, international relations, and 
organizational behavior.26  Early sociology equilibrium theory has also been used in 
modern political violence thought.  An understanding of this general principle is 
                                                 
23 Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1951).  Talcott Parsons, Action Theory and Human Condition (New York: Free Press, 1978).    
Robert G Perrin, “The Functionalist Theory of Change Revisited,” The Pacific Sociological Review 16:1 
(1973): 47-60.  
24 Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy, “Neofunctionalism Today: Reconstructing a Theoretical 
Tradition” in Frontiers of Social Theory; The New Syntheses, ed. George Ritzer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990).  Jeffrey C Alexander and Paul Colomy, “Towards Neofunctionalism: Eisenstadt’s 
Change Theory and Symbolic Interaction,” Sociological Theory 2 (1985): 11-23.  Jeffrey. C Alexander, 
Neofunctionalism (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985).  Paul Colomy, “Recent Developments in 
Functionalist Approach to Change,” Sociological Focus 19 (1986).  Paul Colomy, The Dynamics of Social 
Systems (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992). 
25 Niklas Luhman, “The Paradox of System Differentiation and the Evolution of Society,” in 
Differention Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives, ed. Jeffrey C. 
Alexander and Paul Colomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).  
26 Talcott Parsons and Edward A Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1951). 
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necessary to understand how terrorism leverages that system characteristic to drive 
change.  Chapter III will deal extensively with this notion and use it to support this thesis’ 
central question.   
3.  Equilibrium in Political Violence Theory.  There are several political 
violence studies which acknowledge the importance of equilibrium.  This thesis builds 
heavily upon these works.  Chalmers Johnson in his Revolutionary Change proposes that 
social disequilibrium is a necessary condition for revolution.27  In his analysis of 
revolutionary war, Johnson presents a simple social system model that consists of two 
elements; the “values” and “environment.”  These two components operate in a 
homeostatic balance or equilibrium.28  Johnson contends that when values and 
environments are not in balance, disequilibrium occurs.  This imbalance or 
disequilibrium is necessary, although not sufficient, for revolution.29  Johnson’s simple 
social system model will be the basic social system model which this thesis will expand 
upon.   
Similar logic is found in Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Men Rebel.30  In his treatise on 
Relative Deprivation (RD), Gurr focused on the individual and group causation of 
political violence.  He acknowledges that Johnson’s idea of a social equilibrium (balance 
between a system’s value and environment components) may be the same general 
principle as his RD but at a different level of analysis.31  At the individual level, Gurr 
argues that friction is created when value capabilities do not meet with an individual’s 
value expectations.  If this friction reaches a certain point, violence may occur.  If we 
apply Gurr’s RD hypothesis at the system level, then balance between our values (the 
way the world should be) and the environment (the way the world is) creates societal 
friction that may result in violence.  This thesis will not argue that system level RD is 
                                                 
27 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 41-60. 
28 Johnson, 41-60. 
29 Johnson, 41-60. 
30 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 139.     
31 Gurr, 139. 
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causal to political violence but is referenced here simply to demonstrate that a foundation 
for this value-environment dynamic already exists within political violence theory.     
Gurr’s RD hypothesis is primarily concerned with why and when violence occurs.  
While Gurr postulates that violence can occur in a society because of friction, this thesis 
is more concerned with the structural and functional impact of terrorism on the system 
and why it has the impact that it does.  The next section of this literature review will 
examine some of the major terrorism theories and arguments.      
F.  TERRORISM  
1.  Terrorism Theory.  The volume of terrorism analysis has grown 
exponentially since Sept 2001.  This section cannot examine all of the existing terrorism 
literature but instead offers a review of the more important thoughts and arguments 
relevant to this thesis.  Much of this work is an important contribution to a critical 
national security issue but has not led to a consensus regarding how terrorism works.  
Many disagreements and unknowns still exist in the area of terrorism theory.  These 
disagreements revolve around conflicting definitions, whether environmental or 
psychological factors are causal, or if terrorism actually works.   
While we grapple with these important issues, the use of terrorism is on the rise.   
The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) reported that approximately 14,000 
terrorist attacks occurred globally in 2006.  This includes Iraq and resulted in 
approximately 20,000 deaths.  45 percent of theses fatalities, about 6,600 occurred in 
Iraq.32  Even if you exclude Iraq, still 13,400 people were killed by terrorism in 2006.  
This is a significant increase in contrast from only 3,000 attacks and 6200 terrorist 
fatalities, excluding Iraq, in 2005.  Terrorism is increasingly being seen as an effective 
weapon.  Its popularity is growing despite our mammoth efforts to understand and 
counter it.    
                                                 
32 National Counter Terror Center, “Report on Terrorist Incidents – 2006, 30 April 2007,” National 
Counter Terror Center, http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot2006nctcannexfinal.pdf. (accessed 5 September 
2007). 
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2.  Terrorism Definitions.  The public use of the term continues to morph 
over time and is routinely changed by different users for political, commercial, or legal 
purposes.  The word itself has become so broadly used in various contexts that it has no 
clear meaning.  The media further complicates the issue by using the term terrorism for 
just about anything they wish to sensationalize.33   
While the public understanding of terrorism is murky, there is some growing 
consensus as to the general elements of terrorism.  There are hundreds of terrorism 
definitions in use but for purposes of this paper, we will start this section with a very 
simple definition based on the most widely accepted elements.  This definition will most 
likely be wholly unsatisfying to any serious student of terrorism but will be built upon 
throughout this paper.  Terrorism is a tactic that uses illegal violence or the threat of 
violence to coerce or force political change.  Political change is inherently social change.  
This definition can be argued ad infinitum but it is offered here only to establish a starting 
point.  It noticeably lacks several common elements present in other terrorism definitions 
such as violence directed against non combatants or governments.  This will be discussed 
later in this section.  The following section of this literature review will review only a few 
of the most widely accepted terrorism characteristics and theories.   
3.  Existing Terrorism Analysis.  A contributing factor to the lack of 
theoretical consensus may be partially a result of the way terrorism has been analyzed.  
Acts of terror or terror groups are analyzed and compared to develop overarching 
theories.  This has resulted in the study of isolated pieces of the puzzle without sufficient 
consideration given to the larger complex system or its dynamics.  This has resulted in 
theories and propositions that are valid for some conflicts and groups but are not 
applicable to others.  Applying these existing terrorism theories to different 
environments, in dissimilar systems, over different time periods has proved to be 
problematic.  Much of the existing analysis is useful when studying similar conflicts in 
similar environments but has not led to a definitive understanding of the broader problem.  
Thus, existing terrorism analysis is difficult to apply when building policy that must be 
                                                 
33 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet; the New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 152-153. 
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effective in different regions, conditions, against different groups, conflicts, and over a 
long period of time.  Each society and terrorist group is a unique system and cannot be 
dealt with using a generic policy.   
a.  Political, Violence, or Threat of Violence.  The terrorism analyst, Bruce 
Hoffman describes three major components of terrorism when he described it as violence 
or a threat of violence in pursuit of a political aim.34  This political element is a 
fundamental and perhaps the most widely accepted component of all terrorism 
definitions.  Political motivations are what distinguish terrorism from other violent 
crimes.  Terrorism is a form of political violence and thus a weapon of social change.  It 
is ultimately about using illegal violence to coerce social change.  This coercion can be 
accomplished by actual violence or just the threat of violence.   
b.  Strategic Choice.  Terrorism is a planned, calculated, and systemic act.35  
It is a tactic but its continued use may be in the pursuit of strategic objectives.  One of 
today’s most highly regarded terrorism theorists, Martha Crenshaw, explains that 
terrorism is often a strategic choice.36  She posits that terrorism is a rationally calculated 
choice of means to achieve an objective.  Radical organizations seeking political change 
select “terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives.”37        
Additionally, Robert Pape’s noteworthy book, The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism illustrates this same notion.38  Pape studied suicide terrorism events from 1980 
through 2003, creating a database of 315 attacks.  This data was analyzed and used to 
support several very important terrorism insights.  The first of Pape’s five principal 
findings is that suicide terrorism is strategic.  Although the act may appear irrational to  
 
                                                 
34 Paraphrased from Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 
14-15. 
35 Hoffman, 15. 
36 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), 7-24. 
37 Crenshaw, 8. 
38 Robert A Pape, Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2005). 
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us, suicide terrorism occurs as part of a larger campaign to achieve a specific political 
goal.39  His work concludes that even the most self-destructive form of terrorism, suicide 
bombings, still follows a strategic logic.    
Terrorism is a tactic.  A tactic cannot be defeated like an enemy combatant, but it 
can be countered.  As suggested in the introduction, tactics such as air to air dog fights 
and starving cities are examples of tactics that have been largely countered.  They could 
still be used but are generally considered obsolete or ineffective.  We are not at war with 
the tactic of terrorism but we are at war with individuals and groups who choose 
terrorism as a means to achieve social change. To effectively counter this tactic we must 
understand why it was chosen, what its intended effects are, and how those effects may or 
may not come about.  Terrorism may be used if it offers tactical and strategic gain.40  
That is not to say that everyone who perceives a tactical gain through the use of terrorism 
will adopt it.  In fact, most social change is non violent.  Even those who do choose 
political violence will most likely not resort to terrorism, but those who do choose 
terrorism believe it will work.  
c.  Psychological Forces. Although there is growing consensus that terrorism 
is a choice of means, other notable theorists disagree.  Alternative views such as Gerald 
Post’s “psycho-logic” must at least be considered.41  Post believes that terrorism is 
partially a product of psychological forces and argues that individual “psycho-logic” 
drives terrorism.42  Terrorism is a justification to commit violent acts which certain 
individuals and groups are psychologically prone to commit.43  This is a critical 
distinction that should not be overlooked by policy developers.  If terrorism is rooted in 
individual and group psychological dispositions towards violence, the policies required to 
                                                 
39 Robert A Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 
97:3 (2003), 343. 
40 Crenshaw, 7-24. 
41 Jerald M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces” 
in Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 1998), 25-40.    
42 Post, 25-40.    
43 Post, 25. 
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combat it would be far different than if terrorism is a strategic and mostly rational choice.  
Terrorists who are rational actors and not psychologically predisposed to violent acts can 
be reasoned with.  In this case, policy makers may pursue negotiations to end terrorism.  
Undoubtedly, each person’s individual psyche has some bearing on the choices we make 
giving some credibility to Post’s argument.  Although the psycho-logic argument is 
worthwhile to understand terrorism at the individual level, this thesis is concerned more 
with a systems analysis of terrorism and societies.  For purposes of this thesis, we are not 
addressing why individuals become terrorists.  This “psycho-logic” and “strategic-
choice” argument illustrates just one of the many theoretical debates surrounding 
terrorism.   
d.  Communicative Tool. In addition to its destructive power, terrorism is 
also a communicative tool.  A single attack can simultaneously serve the specific act of 
destruction, coerce a target audience, and act to propagate a message.44  Terrorism is 
considered unique from other forms of political violence because it influences an 
audience by inducing fear.  Even if the physical damage or violence of terrorism is 
limited, the impact on a society can be widespread.  Due to this, acts of terrorism can 
have the capability of discrediting governments or security forces charged with protecting 
the public.  Juergensmeyer also refers to religious violence as “performance violence” 
because it is symbolic, dramatic and theatrical but mostly does little actual harm.45  This 
is an accurate description of most terrorist acts and their impact.  As will be discussed 
later in this paper, these violent performances are acts intended to attack the public sense 
of normalcy while the actual destruction caused is of secondary importance.  
Juergensmeyer also notes that as performance, it is the audience that gives the terrorist an 
almost celebrity status.  The audience gives their actions “an illusion of importance.”46        
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e.  Illegal and Legitimate Uses of Force. Terrorism is illegal.  There are no 
national or international laws that condone terrorism.  It is illegal but various legal bodies 
have defined it differently.  As a result, terrorism is a universally illegal act but has no 
clear set of internationally accepted elements which define it.  As a global community, 
we know we do not like it but can not agree on exactly what it is.  Regardless of the 
definitional ambiguity, being universally illegal is important to our defining terrorism.  
Using illegality as a standard to define terrorism is especially useful to overcome another 
reoccurring theoretical problem of defining terrorism… the target.   
Some terrorism definitions stipulate that violence must be directed against 
civilians or non combatants in order for that act to be classified as terrorism.  As an 
example, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) will only include acts of 
terrorism in their database if political violence is directed at “non combatants.”47  
Conversely, other terrorism definitions specifically exclude any mention of the target.  
For example, the Department of Defense defines terrorism as the “calculated use of 
unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to 
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, 
religious, or ideological.”48  Defining terrorism based on the target set is troublesome 
specifically because of the question of legitimacy.     
One of the challenges in defining terrorism is setting a standard that accurately 
labels terrorism but also accounts for the legitimate uses of force.  Political violence may 
be legitimate against certain targets under certain circumstances.  When that use is or is 
not legitimate, is highly subjective.  It would be academically easier to classify all violent 
political acts as illegal but the law must also outline the legitimate use of such force.  
Healthy societies depend on the law to define both the government and an individual’s 
right to use force under certain circumstances.  Each party of a conflict will undoubtedly 
define combatant, non combatant, legitimate, and illegitimate targets differently.  Any 
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definition of political violence that does not account for legitimate force to protect 
sovereignty or defend against oppression is an unusable definition.  For this reason, the 
type of target should not be used as a critical element to define terrorism.  Instead, 
defining terrorism as illegal allows application of various local or international standards 
that are designed to govern actions in a specific time and place.  Since laws are 
established in social context to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain uses of 
force, they are a more effective element to defining terrorism.   
These are just some of the elements used to define terrorism.  Dozens of other 
definitional criteria are sometimes used and most of these are frequently debated.  Our 
terrorism discussion will now move on to theories of terrorism relevant to this thesis.      
f.  Waves of Terrorism.  Terrorism is inextricably linked to the political and 
social situation of its time.  In 2001, David Rapoport proposed a brilliant theory that 
terrorism evolves in waves, largely corollary to the politics and technology of the 
period.49  These waves or “cycles of activity in a given time period” are largely defined 
by the ideology or “energy” that drove each of those eras.50  Rapoport distinguishes the 
first three waves as; the “Anarchist wave” which lasted until 1920, the “Anti-Colonial 
wave” which mostly ended around 1960, and the “New Left wave” which mostly died 
out around 1979 although there are still some remnants lingering today.  These waves of 
terrorism assumed a personality that followed the doctrine and technology of the time.  
This theory reinforces the notion that both terrorism and societies are interconnected 
systems which impact one another’s evolution.  Although Rapoport did not use systems 
analysis, he does refer to the life cycles of terrorist groups, likening them to living 
systems.  As the world evolves politically and socially it impacts the personality of 
terrorism.  In turn, terrorism impacts political and social evolution.  His fourth wave, 
which we are currently experiencing, is the “religious wave” of terrorism. 
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g.  Religious terrorism: Terrorism is on the rise and so is its association with 
religion.  Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God is the foremost work that tries 
to understand the rise of religious terrorism.  Although this paper is not focused on the 
specific motivations of individuals, religious terrorism is a powerful motivator of modern 
terrorists and must at least be mentioned.  Religion is sometimes a complimentary factor 
and sometimes it is the sole motivation, justification, organization, and world view 
behind terrorism.  Although most us would like to think of religion as peaceful, there is a 
historical attraction between religion and violence.51  The use of violence to achieve 
religious objectives is not new, but religion has increasingly supplied the ideology and 
the organizational structure for modern terror.52  Although this thesis is not focused on 
individual motivations, religion and specifically Islam are important factors as we 
examine Al Qaeda and the attacks of 9/11.  Additionally, terrorism in the name of 
religion may have greater impact on the targeted society than an equivalent level off 
secular violence does.  Americans do not expect religion to be violent and as such are 
surprised when it is.  Terrorism may be more effective at creating social disequilibrium if 
framed in religion.   
h.  Terrorism in Revolution.  Aside from the volumes of pure terrorism 
research, lies a rich body of revolutionary warfare material that at least partially addresses 
terrorism.  Since these works focus on terrorism only in the context of a revolutionary 
war, they tend to view terrorism as a side issue to social political change.  They generally 
viewed terrorism’s primary purpose as to force popular discontent with the government.  
The most influential work to this thesis is Chalmers Johnsons’ Revolutionary Change 
mentioned earlier.  This work will be discussed frequently throughout as it offers the 
value-environment construct used as the basis for DETT.  Johnson viewed revolutionary 
terrorism as a tactic or strategy that “uses violence against insignificant people in order to 
affect the behavior of significant people or their supporters.”53  He viewed terrorism as a 
tactic often adopted in order to turn an already disequalized system into a revolutionary 
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one.54  In this context, terrorism becomes a catalyst once the conditions for revolution 
already exist.  The strategic objective of revolutionary terrorism is to provoke the 
government into an over reaction.  This government overreaction may isolate moderates 
and thus tip a potentially revolutionary situation into a revolution.  Additionally, political 
terrorism may also be used to elicit specific concessions from the establishment.  Certain 
terrorist acts may appear to be tactical successes but revolutionary war theorists generally 
see it as a loosing strategy over the long term.  The physical damage done by terrorism is 
often negligible, but the real impact of terrorism is that it can undermine the legitimacy 
and capability of the government.  The continued use of terrorism by a revolutionary 
movement may build a reliance on it but its continued use ultimately becomes 
counterproductive.  The use of political terrorism in revolutions may be successful at 
undermining the government because it demonstrates the government’s inability to 
regulate the previously discussed balance of forces of a social system.  This 
disequilibrium could cause a population to question its government but is also the reason 
that its continued use will not be tolerated by the masses.   
Early revolutionary warfare studies also used systems thinking to address the 
problem.  An early RAND study by Lietes and Wolf is one of the first pieces to view 
insurgents as a system.  Although rudimentary, this was an important step forward in our 
understanding of asymmetric warfare.55 
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Figure 2.   Leites and Wolf Insurgent System  
Revolutionary war studies are useful for terrorism analysis.  Not only do they 
almost always address terrorism but they are also focused on the violent process of 
social–political change.  The use of systems thinking to study revolution has been carried 
over into the study of terrorism.     
i.  Systems Theory and Terrorism.  Systems theory has been used to 
analyze terror groups as systems that output violence.  Studies of terrorist groups as 
systems such as Thomas, Casebeer, and Kiser’s Warlords Rising are valuable 
contributions to the field because they result in a deeper understanding of the group’s 
dynamics and how these violent actors interrelate to the environment.56  Warlord’s Rising 
uses systems thinking, specifically an open systems framework to analyze Violent Non 
State Actors (VNSA).  This systems approach examines the environment, organization, 
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and internal dynamics of “malignant armed groups.”57  This ambitious work focuses on 
VNSA as systems and how the environment impacts those systems.  Likewise, how 
counterterrorism policies can disrupt the VNSA either directly or by influencing its 
environment.  Using a similar methodology, this paper strives to explain how the 
environment, specifically the social system is impacted by terrorism in an attempt to 
better understand how terrorism works. Additional conflict systems theorists such as 
Anderson, Coyle, Davis, Jenkins, Enders, Walter, and Sanders have analyzed violent 
groups and various conflicts as systems.58  This approach is an excellent tool to analyze 
conflict and can improve specific counterterrorism policies.  These studies examined 
specific conflicts and groups as systems who output violence.   
This thesis will build upon the idea that terrorism is an output but more 
specifically address what happens when that output becomes an input to the social 
system.  We have established that both Al Qaeda and our society are systems.  Various 
post 9/11 analysis of Al Qaeda has led to a deeper understanding of its components, its 
inner workings, and how we can target it.  This is an important process but what happens 
when Al Qaeda’s output becomes a social system input?  This thesis is focused on that 
system’s reaction and how we can leverage that knowledge in the future.     
G.  THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS       
This chapter explained the methodology and reviewed the existing literature used 
in this thesis.  The methodology was to describe the problem, describe the systems at 
work, identify major elements of the system, postulate the system’s structure and 
dynamics, develop a theory/model, evaluate the model, and finally communicate results 
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and conclusions.  The literature review in this chapter highlights existing work in various 
fields needed to support the propositions and ultimately the conclusions of this thesis.  
Major literature and ideas from systems theory, social change theory, and terrorism were 
discussed.  Systems theory can be used effectively to analyze specific terrorist groups and 
social systems.  Both are living, open, complex systems that share certain characteristic 
with all open living systems.  These systems tend to achieve a balance of forces or 
dynamic equilibrium.  This equilibrium is required for a system to operate normally.  
Using these tools we can analyze what negentropic inputs allow systems like terrorist 
group to function and thus how we can end or stunt their life cycle.  Violence is one 
output of violent terrorist systems.  Systems theory will be used throughout this paper to 
analyze how terrorism impacts social change.                             
This literature review could not hope to capture all of the work in any one of these 
prolific subjects but introduced key themes and ideas relevant to understanding how 
terrorism works.  At this point, the reader should understand the methodological process, 
some basic systems concepts, some notions of how social systems change, and sufficient 
terrorism theory needed to move forward.  The following chapter will expand on the 
notion of equilibrium in social systems.  As will be shown in the next section, the 
characteristic of dynamic equilibrium in social systems is the key to understanding 
terrorism’s impact on society.   
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III. THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND EQUILIBRIUM 
THEORY IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
A. THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE  
This short chapter will review the three predominant theories of social change but 
focus on equilibrium theory.  How and why a social system changes is critical to 
understanding terrorism’s impact.  Richard Appelbaum’s Theories of Social Change 
provides an excellent overview of the three major theories of social change.59 
1.  Evolution. Most readers are familiar with the general theory of evolution, 
most notably Darwin’s The Origin Of Species.60  The evolutionary or neoevolutionary 
theories of social change follow Darwin’s evolutionary logic to explain how societies 
evolve over time. 61   Based on this theory, modernization is a product of evolution.  
These theories are much more complex and nuanced than is presented here (dealing with 
specialization, industrialization), but these nuances are not relevant for our purposes.  For 
our purposes, this theory posits that change occurs as a natural process of social 
evolution.  At the system level of analysis, the society may have no or limited 
consciousness of this process.   
Much like an organism undergoing a slow process of change, it does not have an 
awareness that its various components and sub systems are changing.  The organism may 
be unaware but the change is still occurring.  This is also true with social systems.  
Changes occur within their system but the society has no specific awareness of this 
change.  We will return to the idea of social evolution later.     
2.  Conflict Theory.  Another major approach to social change is conflict 
theory.  Conflict theorists believe that the social system is inherently unstable and 
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changes in society are due to internal conflict.  Conflict occurs because society consists 
of interdependent systems that are not well integrated or balanced.  This Hobbes-ian 
perspective sees society in a constant state of conflict for power and influence.  This 
struggle is not always violent if non violent means to achieve power and influence exist.  
A central government is important to impose order on our otherwise primal struggle 
against one another.  Social change thus occurs as a result of this perpetual struggle for 
power and the emergence of central control mechanisms.  The classic Marxist class 
struggle is the most common example.  Conflict theorists believe that internal conflict for 
power and resources is causal to social change.    
3.  Equilibrium Theory. The third major theory of social change is the 
equilibrium theory of change.  As discussed in Chapter II, forces exist in a balance or 
equilibrium.  Social change occurs when exogenous or endogenous inputs are made to the 
system.  These inputs can move the system out of equilibrium.  As a reaction, the system 
enacts change in an effort to restore equilibrium.  This is a system process of self 
maintenance that regulates the components and dynamics of the system.  When the 
system fails to maintain equilibrium, disequilibrium can occur.  Disequilibrium will result 
in system dysfunction.  Each system is unique and thus each systems response to 
disequilibrium will vary.  However, in general, disequilibrium would disrupt the normal 
steady state that societies need to function normally.  Radical social changes such as 
revolution or civil war may be a symptom of disequilibrium. 
Finite points of these three theories conflict but the general notion that all three 
cause social change is plausible.  They can all be equally correct in a broad sense.  As a 
species, we evolve physically and mentally.  Our societies evolve to meet our modern, 
more complex needs.  As our societies progress, change is inherent.  This change can be 
in response to external inputs such as terrorism or internal system conflict among the 
population.  In order to operate effectively, the system is continuously driven to self reify, 
seeking a natural point of dynamic equilibrium.  This homeostatic process may be a 
living system response to inherent and continuous conflict resulting in a need to restore 
system stability.  Because the system inherently seeks balance to limit conflict, changes 
in one part of the system must be countered by other changes to restore or maintain 
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balance.  As change occurs, additional change is required which repeats itself in a 
constant process of change and balance.  This characteristic of system equilibrium acts as 
a social survival mechanism to limit conflict and restore some normal level of social 
equilibrium.  It is homeostatic self regulation and causal to change. 
B. EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS  
1.  Social Equilibrium. The concept of equilibrium has been used by past 
theorists in multiple disciplines to explain actions within social systems and is critical to 
our understanding of how terrorism works.62  We must understand how societies change 
in order to understand how terrorism inflicts or hopes to inflict change.  This section will 
explore the equilibrium theory of social change in greater detail to eventually explain 
how social systems operate and thus how they are impacted by terrorism.  This is 
fundamental to understanding terrorism at a system level. 
As discussed in the literature review, Talcott Parsons is the most noted sociologist 
to advance the concept of social equilibrium as part of his structural-functionalism 
perspective.63  Structural-functionalists see society as a system of interrelated 
components and can be considered the systems thinkers of sociology.  Just as a terrorist 
group’s structure and function are critical to our understanding of how they operate, so to 
is an in depth understanding of the structure and function of the society in which the 
terrorism occurs.  Our society is an array of components and sub systems that interrelate 
to form a large, complex, interdependent, and dynamic system.  As a living system, each 
component of a society contributes to its operation.  Parsons explains that permanent 
social systems have a tendency to self-maintain order, expressed by him as the concept of 
equilibrium.64  In line with both Bertalanffy and Miller’s notion of steady state, this 
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equilibrium is not static but is instead an “ordered process of change.”65  Parsons 
theorized that the interrelation of a system’s parts was critical to orderly system change as 
it limited randomness and thus increased stability.  The characteristic of equilibrium is 
important to keep society functioning through a healthy, balancing process of change.   
2.  Homeostasis versus Equilibrium.  A note is required here concerning the 
term “equilibrium.”  Past sociologists, namely Parsons, suggested that self-maintenance 
of equilibrium is a fundamental characteristic of social systems.  However, what he 
describes is not by definition true equilibrium.  Instead, the term equilibrium was used by 
him and others to describe the maintenance of some social balance between multiple 
social forces. 
True equilibrium (in its purest theoretical sense) is not achievable for a social 
system, but a moving or dynamic equilibrium between two or more variables is.  Further, 
the process by which biological systems maintain dynamic equilibrium or a balance of 
various forces is called homeostasis.  Some authors would prefer the use of the term 
homeostasis in place of the term equilibrium to describe this organic ability of a system 
to rebalance various internal forces.  Homeostasis is simply an organism’s ability to self-
regulate by adjusting physiological processes.66   
There are important implications of this homeostatic concept for both social 
systems and terrorist groups.  Viewing terrorism as a living system, an example of 
homeostasis could be group leadership.  Like most organized groups, they require a 
certain level of leadership to function.  Leadership can take many different forms such as 
hierarchal, decentralized, networks and so forth but a certain level is required.  We should 
not mistake the decentralized, cell like structure of terrorist networks to mean a lack of 
leadership; it is simply a more effective structure for their particular system.  Leaders are 
important to set priorities, manage resources, and operations.  Too many or too few 
leaders may lead to dysfunction.  Having too many leaders may deplete the number of 
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people available for operations or other necessary functions while creating internal power 
struggles.  Too few leaders could lead to disorganization, uncoordinated operations, lack 
of resources and generally poor performance.  For these reasons, there is an optimum 
level of leadership based on a group’s organization, size, or objectives.  In other words, 
given the structure and function of this particular system, there is a balance of leadership 
that results in effective performance.  The range of effective performance is the group 
leadership equilibrium.  It may never reach an optimum point but if maintained within 
some certain leadership range, can be effective.  The further outside this range it is (too 
many or too few leaders), the less effective the leadership will be. This is of course a 
simplification of the real leadership challenges.   
In reality, all leaders are not equal, technology may allow for fewer leaders, and 
certain group dynamics may impact the leadership situation.  The leadership equilibrium 
in this example is not just about numbers, but concerned with some combination of 
leadership variables.  Leadership at the individual and group level of analysis is more 
complex but is offered here as a social system level example of dynamic equilibrium.  
Leadership equilibrium naturally exists as a characteristic of the terror group system, 
when it fails this balance may fall into relative disequilibrium and negatively impact 
operations.  Homeostasis is the ability of the group to naturally adjust its level of 
leadership to fall with a range of equilibrium.  Change is normal in this process.  If too 
many leaders exist, conflict may arise and result in several being demoted or killed off.  If 
too few are in place, leaders will rise from lower ranks to fill the void.  This is a natural 
process to attain a balanced level of leadership.  This process may seem chaotic or 
dysfunctional at the individual or group level but it is actually an orderly system process 
of homeostatic equalization.  By definition, this is not true equilibrium because of the 
constant fluctuation but is a balance moving towards equilibrium.  This process will be 
referred to as dynamic equilibrium for the remainder of this thesis. 
3.  Arguments against Equilibrium.  The sociology debate over the 
existence, utility, and degree of usefulness over the equilibrium hypothesis is ongoing.  
Two of the major concerns are discussed here.   
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The theory of equilibrium has been accused of being too preoccupied with 
stability.  Parsons himself was accused of being too occupied with the study of social 
structure and function to adequately address change.67  It has been argued that social 
equilibrium emphasizes “self-maintenance and a return to a particular state if disturbed, 
implies an emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo.”68  This argument would have 
merit if the pure scientific definition of equilibrium were used.  Instead, as discussed 
above, Parsons’ idea of equilibrium is really a dynamic – changing drive to equilibrium 
and the process of homeostasis.   Self-maintenance and a return to relative equilibrium 
does not equate to “status quo” in a society.  It is a process of balance, not a process to 
achieve any particular constant variable.  If you add weight to one arm of a scale until it 
equals the other, you have created a balance of opposing forces but did not return to the 
same weight you began with.  The same is true in society, the process of balancing forces 
or dynamic equilibrium is real and continuous but it always leaves the social system 
different.       
Another valid concern is the parameter of equilibrium.  Past social scientists have 
questioned whether Parsons’ original notions of equilibrium were too strict and believed 
it did not allow for structural changes when a system was determined to be outside of 
equilibrium.69  What are the bounds that define equilibrium versus disequilibrium?  What 
happens when a system is in disequilibrium?  These are important concerns for the 
analysis of a specific system but impossible to answer definitively across all systems.  
Each system is unique and therefore has a unique tolerance for equilibrium and 
disequilibrium.  The parameters of dynamic equilibrium and a system’s reaction to 
various degrees of disequilibrium are unique to each system.  In general, it is sufficient at 
this point to state that a social system does not function normally when in disequilibrium.  
Additionally, each system’s parameters for equilibrium are not static and may change as 
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the system changes.  As inputs are made to the system and homeostatic changes occur, 
they may fundamentally change the system’s structure and organization which results in 
new parameters for equilibrium.  Change disrupts equilibrium but is also a normal 
function of it.70  Each system’s tolerance for disequilibrium changes as the system goes 
through the continuous process of social change.  As these changes occur, dynamic 
equilibrium is maintained (or restored) and a “qualitatively different equilibrium” is 
maintained.71  It is most useful at this point to consider dynamic equilibrium a continuum 
and not a fixed data point.  Each analysis of a specific system must determine and specify 
the parameters of disequilibrium based on their assessment of normal system operations.  
The process of dynamic equilibrium maintains overall system balance through system 
change.  Systems, through the interaction of its parts, must stay within the boundaries of 
dynamic equilibrium to operate in normally.72   
The debate (like most social science theories) will continue but Parsons’ work is 
an insightful starting point to understand how social systems change.  
4.  Dynamic Equilibrium.  For purposes of this paper I consider social 
system dynamic equilibrium: an organic characteristic of all social systems to move 
towards balance between two or more social forces that results in social changes.  It is a 
homeostatic balancing of forces, not a return to a status quo.  Perfect equilibrium may 
never be achieved but the drive to achieve it results in social changes.  Social system 
homeostasis is the process by which society self-regulates or tries to achieve a dynamic 
equilibrium.  Dynamic equilibrium is inherently homeostatic and will not be re specified 
as such throughout the remainder of the thesis.  True social equilibrium (parity of 
opposing forces) is improbable but the process by which society balances multiple forces 
is that of dynamic equilibrium.  When a social system strays outside its particular 
parameters of dynamic equilibrium it will enter disequilibrium.    
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C.  EQUILIBRIUM AND TERRORISM  
Societies exist in various states of balance.  Dynamic equilibrium is one way to 
understand social change and thus how terrorism works.  Various components of the 
social system operate in a balance that can be disrupted.  Inputs to the system can alter 
the balance of forces.  The characteristic of dynamic equilibrium balances these changes 
and inputs which occur throughout the system as a self maintaining survival mechanism.  
Inputs to the system can come from inside or from outside the society.   
American society is very open to routine internal and external inputs.  Political 
activism is an example of internal inputs that can force peaceful change.  Other examples 
of inputs to the system may be natural disasters, civil unrest, or violence.  Any of these 
events has the ability to impact the system’s dynamic equilibrium.  If that balance is 
disrupted, the system forces other changes to restore a balance which results in a 
continuous and healthy process of change.  Without this process, social forces would 
become increasingly imbalanced and thus increasingly dysfunctional.   
Based on this process, external actors could make inputs to the system that are 
intended to imbalance dynamic equilibrium and change the system. This is how terrorism 
operates.  A significant disruption of this balance can lead to system dysfunction, 
revolutionary changes, or even system collapse.   
The characteristic of dynamic equilibrium is a balance of forces but the next 
logical question is which social forces?  To answer this, we must first determine the 
components, organizations, and dynamics of the system to be examined.  The following 
chapter will break down the social system and its components to better understand how 
terrorism leverages dynamic equilibrium.  The following chapter will introduce the 






IV. DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF TERRORISM… 
HOW TERRORISM WORKS   
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will present the Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism (DETT) 
as a context to understand terrorism.  The previous chapters established a theoretical 
foundation for the ideas contained here.  DETT is simply a new articulation of already 
established social, systems, and equilibrium theory.  The first section of this chapter will 
first outline DETT and the remaining sections will support and expand these initial ideas.  
Since this theory is built upon system theory it is important to identify the structure, 
components, and dynamics of the system.  These properties determine how the system 
will react to terrorism.  This chapter will explain DETT as a useful framework to analyze 
complex social system problems such as terrorism.   
B. DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF TERRORISM: 
Society is a complex system governed by the characteristic of openness and 
dynamic equilibrium.  Terrorism is an input to this social system.  The system principal 
of dynamic equilibrium, as outlined in chapter III, attempts to maintain a balance of 
various social forces so the system can function.  When various social forces are out of 
balance, dynamic equilibrium is a catalyst that spurs change in an attempt to rectify the 
imbalance.  Inputs such as terrorism can disrupt equilibrium and thus drive change in the 
system.  Terrorism works by creating some level of social disequilibrium and thus 
social/political change.  To understand the concept with more specificity, we need a 
better understanding of the components that are balanced by dynamic equilibrium and 
disrupted by inputs of terrorism.    
This thesis adopts a simple but useful model of the social system composed of 
only two primary components; value and the environment.  These two components, 
explained in greater detail below, exist in a balance.  When these two components are in 
balance (or relative equilibrium) the system can be considered healthy and will function 
 44
normally.  The farther out of equilibrium these two components are, the greater the 
property of dynamic equilibrium will act as an impetus for change.  Therefore, inputs to 
one or both of the systems primary components that decrease equilibrium, can force 
change.  Terrorism causes change in the system by creating an imbalance of social forces.  
Although all political violence is intended to force change, terrorism does so by being an 
input to a system’s environment that is at immediate odds with its value component and 
thus increases relative disequilibrium between the two.  This imbalance thus results in 
changes to restore value-environment balance.   
The dynamic equilibrium theory of terrorism is:  Terrorism is a tactic that is 
chosen because it is perceived to work as a tool for social/political change.  It is a violent 
input to the environment at immediate and recognizable odds with a system’s values and 
as such decreases the equilibrium between the two.  When some level of disequilibrium 
exists between the value and environment components, the homeostatic characteristic of 
dynamic equilibrium tends to drive changes within the system in an effort to restore 
value-environment equilibrium.  Therefore, terrorism can induce political/social change 
by targeting social system equilibrium.    
This concept is represented graphically in Figure 3.  Inputs to the system either 
improve or disrupt the value-environment balance.  Due to the homeostatic characteristic 
of dynamic equilibrium, imbalances spur other changes within the system in an attempt to 
restore parity.  
 
Figure 3.   Process of Dynamic Equilibrium 
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Terrorism does work to spur changes in social systems but rarely achieves its 
intended objectives.  The immediate impact of terrorism may lead its users to believe it is 
effective.  Each society and government will be impacted by and respond to similar types 
of terrorism differently. Every system is unique and thus inputs of terror may force 
change easily in one system but not in another.   
If this input of terrorism moves the system too far out of equilibrium, true 
disequilibrium may occur.  A state of true disequilibrium exists when the system cannot 
function using its existing structure or organization.  In this situation, the mechanisms 
that normally govern change are no longer adequate to equalize the system.  Recovery 
from disequilibrium will result in structural or functional changes that may result in a 
fundamentally different system.  Violence will most likely be associated with 
disequilibrium.       
Each system is unique but with a clearer understanding of the system and the use 
of DETT, it may be possible to predict how certain terrorism inputs may impact the 
system and thus which counterterrorism policies will be most effective.   
DETT offers an explanation concerning the interplay of terrorism and social 
systems.  Properly conceptualized, DETT can be a useful tool in understanding 
relationships between social system change and terrorist activities.  The remainder of this 
chapter will further explain these ideas and focus on the dynamics that occur within a 
social system when terrorism strikes.  As suggested below, the building block of this 
theory is the value-environment construct as a social system structure.         
C.  SOCIAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE 
The predominant theoretical approach to analyze social systems is not the value-
environment construct introduced above.  Social science traditionally views society as a 
series of interacting human components such as individuals, groups, bureaucracies and 
institutions.73  Talcott Parsons examined social systems as a “plurality of individual 
                                                 
73 Robertson, 90-94.  This is perhaps the most common approach to social system analysis.  Society 
and social systems are studied as purely human structures that focus on statuses, roles, groups, and human 
institutions.  
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actors interacting with each other.”74  This approach aimed at assessing human societies 
as a separate system from (although impacted by) the surrounding environment.  While a 
useful approach to examine components of a human system it is not the best approach 
when determining how terrorism impacts society as a whole.   
Instead, the value-environment approach considers the social system as including 
the physical environment.  Kenneth Boulding in Ecodynamics suggests that one cannot 
view the “human social constellation” separate from its environment.  He states that 
“there is no sense at this stage of evolution on earth in talking about ‘the environment’ as 
if it were nature without the human race.”75  Human society is part of the environment 
and the environment is an integrated variable which impacts how human systems operate.  
It is the position of this paper that examining society outside the context of the 
environment could lead to an incomplete analysis of terrorism’s impact on society and 
vice-versa. 
In his book Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson introduced the value-
environment construct.  He utilized it as a tool to understand when societies were ripe for 
revolution, but this thesis argues its relevance for the study of terrorism.76  As illustrated 
in Figure 4, society is separated into two primary components; the environment and 
value.  These two elements are the core components of the social system that represent 
the division of the physical and non physical components of our society.  In the following 
section we will first examine each component separately and then discus how the 
dynamic interaction of these two components is useful to understanding terrorism.     
 
                                                 
74 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), 5. 
75 Kenneth E. Boulding, Ecodynamics; A New Theory of Societal Evolution (Beverly Hill: Sage 
Publications, 1978), 31.  
76 Johnson, 41-60. 
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Figure 4.   Social System Components77  
 
D.   SOCIAL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
1.   Environment.  The environment represents the physical world and 
includes the system’s physical condition.  The environment consists of natural terrain, 
man made terrain (buildings, infrastructure, etc), individuals, groups, and any physical 
actions.  This includes all physical aspects of a population such as demographics, 
language, physical ethnic markers, education, finances, resources, etc.78   
Environment variables can be subdivided into countless categories and 
subcomponents.  Defining the environment is important but must be done for the specific 
system being examined.  Each social system and its environmental components are 
unique and thus should be determined before an analysis begins.  The level of social 
system analysis and boundaries of the system must be specified.  Depending on the scope 
of the analysis, the environment could be detailed to the individual level or left broad 
such as only defining only a few general environmental sub components.   
                                                 
77 The author was initially exposed to these general concepts of value-environment and the illustration 
at Figure 4 during Naval Postgraduate School, Seminar in Guerilla Warfare, Spring 2007, taught by 
Professor Gordon McCormick.  This value-environment construct was discussed to illustrate Chalmers 
Johnson’s notion of social disequilibrium as a necessary condition for revolution.       
78 The World Trade Center Towers and the American Airlines 767 that hit it were components of the 
environment.  When the later met the former at a high rate of speed the environment changed.       
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The sub components of environment used will remain broad but the task of 
categorizing all sub components of the American social system could be a mammoth 
analysis.  Instead, Chapter V of this thesis will identify and examine only the major sub 
systems of the American social system environment useful to detect equilibrium changes 
post 9/11.  Figure 5 illustrates some of these potential environment variables.  
 
Figure 5.   Environment Examples  
A major hypothesis of this thesis is that terrorism, as a physical act, alters the 
environment.  It kills people, destroys buildings, and alters terrain.  It can potentially 
impact military capabilities, economies, decrease standards of living, and makes other 
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changes to the environment.  As an observable act, we are familiar with the 
environmental impacts of terrorism but far less familiar with its impact on values.     
2. Values.  The values of a social system represent the mental and emotional 
components of the system.  Hence, values are essential to how a social system thinks and 
believes.  Values are “socially shared ideas about what is good, right or desirable.”79  It is 
the way a society believes the world should. 
Parsons described values as “the commitment of individual persons to pursue and 
support certain directions or types of action for the collectivity as a system and hence 
derivatively for their own roles in collectivity.”  Values, in other words, are an 
explanation of a social system’s standards of appropriate action, designed to produce 
some desired outcome.80  Doctrines, ideology, morals, political persuasions, or religious 
beliefs can all be part of society’s values.   
a.  Value Sub-Components.  Societies have collective values.  The sub-
components of value are frequently studied sociological topics and difficult to measure.  
We can determine these collective values through observation, surveys, polls, and a 
societies own words.  Norms are one subset of values as they set social standards.  They 
are “shared rules or guidelines that prescribe the behavior appropriate in a given 
situation.”81   
Roles are also an important aspect of this variable.  The physical role of an 
individual or group is part of the environment but the role which they believe they should 
play is an important part of the value component.  Our values also define the roles and 
status of government.  Collective values are a source of government power.  They grant 
legitimacy to a legitimate authority.82   
Culture can be seen as a physical manifestation of these values.  It is the social 
system’s identity or personality derived from its shared values.  We cannot see the 
                                                 
79 Robertson, 64. 
80 Johnson, 22. 
81 Robertson, 62. 
82 Johnson, 31. 
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cognitive and emotional elements of culture but understand it from its physical 
manifestations such as food, art, literature, language, and family or community 
interaction.   
b.  Values are heterogeneous.   Each system is unique but in most social 
systems, individuals and groups have different beliefs of what the world should be or 
how we should act.  Therefore the social system value components are not homogenous, 
but instead a consensus of what is perceived as acceptable behavior.   
Values are a mix of different beliefs but a collective value does emerge.  This 
results in one value component composed of many different sub beliefs.  If there is strong 
social consensus on the issue it becomes a nearly homogenous data point of our collective 
values.  However, more often and more difficult for society are issues where no clear 
consensus emerges.  Challenges for societies and governments can arise from a 
fragmented value component.  Often political activists may and do try to take advantage 
of these fissures between value sets.       
Conflict theory could be viewed, using this model, as a conflict of the system’s 
value component.  Traditional conflict theory views some type of political or social 
conflict as causal to violence.  Conflict theorists would argue that the competition for 
resources, status, or power is our natural state.  They contend that social change occurs as 
a result of these conflicts.   
If the value-environment construct is used to examine this notion, it becomes 
wholly complimentary to equilibrium and evolutionary theory rather than exclusive of 
them.  Conflict among world-views is inevitable.  The value component of society is 
inherently diverse and grows more so as societies receive input and evolve.  Conflict 
within this value component can, but not always, cause conflict in the environment.  
Certain systems have mechanisms to allow for greater diversity within a value component 
while others may not.  Conflict theory as discussed in Chapter III could be viewed as a 
system’s fragmented value component.  Disagreement or fragmentation among this a 
social system’s value component is inevitable but when it is acted upon physical conflict 
may occur.  Different individuals or groups within the same system view the environment 
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differently and take steps to modify the environment so that it better matches their values.  
Thus, a conflict in values manifests itself in the environment which may lead to physical 
conflict.  Conflict theory could be seen as a physical manifestation of value 
fragmentation.   
American societal values are very diverse but do not routinely lead to political 
violence. Take, for example, the relationship of increased domestic security to civil 
liberties.  This is currently one of the most pressing domestic counterterrorism 
challenges.  Many counterterrorism measures are perceived as oppressive and restrictive.  
There is a common perception that increased security equals decreased civil liberties.   
The fragmentation of this value sub component is evident in a recent Pew 
Research Center poll, listed at Figure 6.  The question “What concerns you more about 
the government’s anti-terrorism policies?” shows that 50% of Americans believe that the 
government has not gone far enough to provide security.  However, one third of the 
population believes civil liberties have been eroded too far.  This is a significant split of 
the population on a core American belief.  The polarization on this issue is evident from 
today’s political and media coverage of contentious issues such as national identification 
cards, the Patriot Act, and recent “domestic spying” initiatives.  The balance between 
civil liberties and our public tolerance for additional security should be tantamount to our 
counterterrorism planning.  Based on this current pew data, the public value is 
fragmented on this issue but there is still half the population that believes security has not 
gone far enough.            
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Figure 6.   American Values - “Civil Liberty Concerns”83 
c.  Values Change.  Societies form collective beliefs but they are not 
necessarily fixed.  Certain beliefs such as civil liberties may be fundamental to a certain 
society but are still malleable.  Values change slowly so may appear fixed but do change 
over time. 
Additionally, open social systems may change more rapidly than a closed 
society.84  A good example of changing values is the global decline in the acceptance of 
suicide terrorism.  Based on world events and media coverage, the public perception may 
be that suicide terrorism is increasingly being accepted by Muslims.  This is not correct.  
In July 2007, the Pew Research Center published a surprising global attitudes survey.  
The report is surprising because it finds that the world is generally a happier place today 
than it was in 2002 and that suicide terrorism is decreasingly being accepted by some 
Muslims.85  Specifically, the data shown in Figure 7 reflects a “sharp” decline in support 
for suicide bombings against civilians in the defense of Islam in most Muslim countries 
surveyed.   
                                                 
83 PEW Research Center, Iran a Growing Danger, Bush Gaining on Spy Issue (2007), http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=269 (accessed 9 October 2007). 
84 The relative openness of societies will be discussed later in this chapter. 
85 PEW Research Center, A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World; Sharp Decline in 
Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries, (2007), 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=257 (accessed 9 October 2007). 
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Figure 7.   Pew, Changes in Global Values   
 




Data is not available for all countries but these trends are surprising and 
encouraging.  This demonstrates that system values can be changed and a downward 
trend in public support for suicide terrorism is a positive, although rarely heard 
development.   
Another interesting value change listed in Figure 8 has been the declining Muslim 
confidence in Osama Bin Laden.  In the surveyed countries, there was a significant 
decline opinions concerning Bin Laden’s ability as a leader.  Even in the Palestinian 
territories where little political or social progress has occurred, there was still a 15% 
decline in confidence for Bin Laden.   
Although the downward trend is positive, the number of respondents that 
considered Bin Laden “somewhat confident” to perform as a world leader is still 
troubling high.  Based on the declining operational capability of Al Qaeda in Iraq, it is 
fair to say that confidence for Bin Laden in Iraq is also following these trends.  The 
decrease in support for both suicide terrorism and Bin Laden could suggest an interesting 
value shift in the Muslim world away from terrorism as a legitimate means to pursue 
social-religious change.        
d.  Use of Force. When examining terrorism, an important part of the value 
component is the legitimate versus illegitimate use of force.  Our values (as defined by 
the government) define what, when, and how force should be used legitimately.  Some 
argue that this is the most important function of values in a society.86  Collectively, as a 
free democratic society we determine when individuals and the government can use 
force.  In many cases, laws are used to codify these social limits on the use of force.87  
However, on occasion, legal violence may be viewed as illegitimate while illegal 
violence may be considered legitimate.  Our laws do not always support the current 
collective value.  In America, we accept that police and military forces must exert force 
to protect our neighborhoods and country but we impose limits.  We even accept use of 
                                                 
86 Johnson, 27. 
87 Laws could also be used to change values or as a repressive measure that controls individual action 
when there is value – environment relative disequilibrium.  Although cynics would disagree, in a 
democratic society, laws generally reflect our collective values.   
 55
force by civilians under certain conditions.  When force exceeds the standards of our 
collective values, Americans are quick to protest even if those acts are technically legal.  
Police brutality, the a Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and most recently the Blackwater 
private security company’s shooting of at least two Iraqi civilians are examples of public 
discontent with our government uses of force.  Our values may not keep these incidents 
from happening but do set an important social limit on the accepted use of force.  The 
more control a population has over its own government of course determines how much 
they can regulate government behavior.  Democratic governments are responsive to the 
collective values of its public.  We will further examine the roles of governments below.   
In addition to setting limits on the use of force, collective values can also sanction 
violence.  In some cases, it can sanction political violence against our own government.  
In America, political activism is encouraged but sometimes crosses the line and civilian 
violence is exerted.  Although illegal, sometimes this civil violence may actually fall 
within an accepted value parameter.  The 1999 World Trade Organization protests in 
Seattle are a possible example.  Some of these protests were illegal, violent, and costly 
but some Americans believed these acts were a valid form of social protest against 
globalization and economic hegemony.  This example demonstrates that certain values 
can sanction or condemn political violence.   
So far we have examined society as a complex system that can be analyzed many 
different ways.  This section introduced a simple yet useful model to view the social 
system as an interaction between two primary system components; values and 
environment.  In this model, value is the mental and emotional component of the system 
while the environment represents the physical dimension.  As an open system, our society 
is subject to internal and external inputs.  These inputs can change both the value and 
environment components which may disrupt the dynamic equilibrium between the two.   




E. SYSTEM INPUTS 
1. Inputs.  Once the system has been defined we can examine how inputs 
impact the system.  These inputs can be made to both the value and the environment 
components.  Examples of terrorist inputs to the environment are observable and fairly 
obvious.  This input generally causes destruction and casualties.  However, terrorist 
inputs to the targets system’s values are more subtle, not necessary illegal, but equally 
important.  An example may be when Islamists convince a local population that suicide 
bombing is a moral and honorable act.  Through a series of non violent inputs, they can 
change the subject’s beliefs.   
Al Qaeda has also implemented an offensive against our values.  We see and 
understand the environmental inputs of the Islamist attack but Al Qaeda has also attacked 
our values on numerous occasions.  In this effort, they have even been partially 
successful in convincing Americans that the 9/11 attacks were justified by United States 
policies in the Middle East.  They use the internet, satellite television, taped broadcasts 
and spokesmen to impact our values.   
Bin Laden uses two different narrative strategies depending on his audience, one 
designed for western audiences and another to his perceived Muslim constituency.  To 
Americans he is careful to frame his actions as a localized defensive fight in response to 
oppressive foreign policies.  He attempts to have his message resonate with American 
values.  Within the Muslim world he is more honest about his global ambitions and 
religious motivations.   
As suggested implicitly above, inputs can be made to both the value and 
environmental components of a system.  Al Qaeda is pursuing a two front offensive, one 
against our environment and the other against America’s value component.  Their attacks 
are an example of inputs that come from outside of our system (exogenous) but inputs 
can also come from within (endogenous).   
2 Endogenous Inputs.  Endogenous inputs can come from a variety of 
internal sources.  Inputs are considered endogenous if the come from within the system.  
The government, institutions, activist groups, and even individuals are capable of making 
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significant endogenous inputs to the social system.  Most of the internal individual inputs 
are minor and induce only gradual or negligible system change.  The vast majority of 
these routine endogenous inputs do not alter the value or environment components in 
such a way as to effect equilibrium in any meaningful way.   
Collectively, however, those relatively minor and gradual inputs can result in 
change without major system shocks or disruption.  This gradual change through routine 
inputs can be thought of as social evolution.  The slow, balanced march forward of a 
society.  Although most of the inputs are minor, together over time, they can have 
significant effects on the system.  The notion of chaos theory, encapsulate this system 
dynamic.  Countless inputs are made to the system that individually have a negligible 
effect, but combined together, cause a domino effect which over time leads to significant 
change.  For example, our individual spending habits are relatively insignificant and 
would not normally be considered a counterterrorism issue.  However, when combined 
with other people’s spending habits, these choices drive the consumer market.  This 
consumer economy in turn expands into new regions and develops new products based 
on our collective spending habits.  Increased production requires more energy and 
specifically oil and ties us economically to the Middle East.  Eventually, one’s seemingly 
chaotic spending habits do have a systemic impact on national security and 
counterterrorism policy.   
Although this paper is concerned with terrorism, the majority of these internal 
system inputs are non violent.  Non violent social change occurs via this endogenous 
input process.  Take for example the American electoral process.  Candidates promise or 
represent a set of beliefs that translate to a certain future environment.  Constituents, who 
share the candidate’s values and desire the future environment being offered, cast votes 
(which are essentially inputs) for that individual.  Elected leaders win because the 
majority of the system believes they will bring about a future environment that best meets 
our value component.  The electoral process is a non violent system mechanism designed 
to govern political change.  Whenever we make changes to our own system, our inputs 
tend to be measured and peaceful.  We understand inherently that radical or sudden 
inputs can negatively impact our own system and thus ourselves.  When endogenous 
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agents make disruptive endogenous inputs such domestic terrorism, normally internal 
system mechanisms are usually in place to deal with the disruption and agent.  For 
example, the domestic terrorists are dealt with through the criminal justice system.  
Exogenous agents do not share this concern about our system and the system may not 
have control over them.    
3.  Exogenous Inputs.  Exogenous inputs come from outside the system.  Al 
Qaeda is an exogenous agent who makes exogenous inputs to our system.  Although they 
exist outside the system’s boundaries, external agents have the ability to make inputs and 
thus influence our system.  This exposure and often vulnerability to exogenous inputs is 
an inherent danger of open systems.  The more open the system, the more exposed we are 
to exogenous inputs such as Al Qaeda.  However, this increased exposure does not 
automatically equate to vulnerability.  An open system has greater exposure but if it is 
also a flexible system, it will be less impacted by external inputs.  America is a very open 
system but also very flexible.  It receives many exogenous inputs but also processes them 
more effectively without disruption to the system.   
Responding to exogenous vice endogenous actors is inherently more difficult for 
a system because it has little or no control over them.  Within our own system, we can 
create mechanisms to deal with negative internal inputs such as crime.  Our social system 
has developed an intricate system of law, enforcement, judiciary, and corrections to deal 
with this type of endogenous behavior.  Hence, if Al Qaeda existed within our system, 
they could seemingly be dealt with by internal system mechanisms.  These mechanisms 
may not exist or be effective against exogenous inputs.  External or exogenous agents 
have the ability to impact us while our ability to retaliate is limited by the boundaries of 
our system.  This gives exogenous agents a marked advantage to affect our system 
without suffering the consequences of the action.   
The attacks of 9/11 were exogenous inputs.  They altered the physical 
environment of the American system in the form of three thousand dead and $95 billion 
in estimated damages.  Environment inputs are obvious but Al Qaeda also took actions 
outside our system that impacted our values.  Most Americans were outraged at the 
celebrations by some Muslim communities shown on television immediately after 9/11.  
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These celebrations may have been partially legitimate but were also encouraged by 
Islamists partially to provoke American hate and hopefully a reaction.  Some Americans 
have fallen prey to subsequent Al Qaeda rhetoric that we “deserved it” or at least partially 
instigated it.  These actions, outside our system had the effect of impacting our values.    
The brilliance of this attack was its multi pronged nature that changed our environment, 
attacked our values, and created a certain level of disequilibrium between the two that is 
resulting in social change. 
In sum, international terrorism directed at the United States is a violent 
exogenous input that targets the value-environment relationship.  By increasing some 
level of disequilibrium, terrorists attempt to create change in our system.  The response or 
changes made may not be the changes they wanted but changes will occur.   
As each system reacts differently, based on its unique structure and dynamics, it is 
now important to discuss social system dynamics.  These dynamics will determine how 
inputs are received and processed by the system.       
F. SOCIAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
The behavior of the social system is governed by certain characteristics, 
components, organization, and how all those components interact.  These system 
dynamics govern how a system processes or reacts to inputs such as terrorism.  
Understanding the systems reaction to inputs may help us predict its behavior in certain 
circumstances.  For this reason, understanding the dynamics of the American social 
system can help us understand and potentially predict how (and why) it reacts to 
terrorism in certain ways.  This section will examine the idea of system 
openness/flexibility, review the characteristic of dynamic equilibrium, and the concept of 
disequilibrium.  It will then explore how the system changes at certain levels of analysis, 
why the speed of system inputs matters, and finally the role of a government sub system.    
1.  System Openness and Flexibility are Relative.  The openness of each 
system is relative.  Not all open systems allow the same amount or types of inputs into 
the system.  Likewise some systems are flexible and can deal with inputs that other more 
inflexible systems cannot.  For these reasons, similar inputs of terrorism may impact 
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different social systems in drastically different ways which makes the application of 
general terrorism theory across different systems difficult.  It may be beneficial to 
categorize different systems as open or closed (relatively) and flexible or inflexible.  
These differentiations have an impact on how a system receives and processes inputs.   
A good comparison of relative system openness and flexibility is North Korea and 
the United States.  The United States is a very open system.  We are a society based on 
free speech and open communication.  We encourage inputs.  We may not like those 
inputs but we consider it a healthy part of the social system.  As a result, the United 
States has evolved into an extremely flexible system which deals well with inputs.  We 
are open-flexible.   
On the opposite side of that spectrum is North Korea.  The North Korean 
authoritarian government has created an environment that purposefully limits the amount 
of exogenous inputs.  The system allows few inputs in and thus has less adjusting to do.  
As a result, they do not need to manage many system changes.  The system is rigid and 
has not evolved to absorb many external changes.  North Korea can be considered a 
closed-inflexible system.   
If exogenous inputs enter an inflexible system, they may be more likely to 
generate a value-environment mismatch and force change than in an open-flexible 
system.  Obviously something the North Korean government does not want.  Since the 
divide of Korea in 1953, the North Korean government has been masterful at maintaining 
power in the face of dire social-economic conditions.  They have done so by blaming 
others, fostering a rabid nationalism, and repression of all dissent.  The population has 
been insulated from external inputs and their values are largely controlled by the 
government.  However, say for example that we were able to make input to the North 
Korean value component.  What would happen if the North Korean population began to 
believe that their social-economic hardships are caused by the North’s failed government 
policies?  If this value component was changed with no corresponding environment 
change, disequilibrium could be induced.  Change would be needed to rebalance the 
system.   
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Since the government does not have the capability to improve welfare conditions, 
the North Korean regime’s options are limited.  As a closed-inflexible system, they 
control all of the system’s mechanisms for change and can adjust values much more 
effectively than other societies.  They can increase coercive policies against dissent, 
arrest instigators, and promise further punishment.  This is an endogenous environmental 
input that further serves to increase a fear of dissent.  A tight control of system inputs and 
ability to manipulate the value variable, North Korea is capable of maintaining system 
dynamic equilibrium within a parameter that allows the system to function and regime 
continued existence.  Closed-inflexible systems have greater control but are more fragile 
if inputs do get into the system.   
This is certainly not what most would view as a healthy system, but it is 
equalized.  Balance is not a moral standard, just a system measurement.  Equalized does 
not mean preferable to outsiders.  The hypothetical in this example is not new, but using 
the value-environment construct to analyze these actions is informative.  Viewing 
political control in this fashion could allow us to better predict system reaction to specific 
inputs.  Even the North Korean system is subject to system characteristics and dynamics. 
The characteristic of dynamic equilibrium, discussed at length in Chapter III, mandates a 
value-environment balance.  The following section will relate this characteristic directly 
to terrorism. 
2.   Dynamic Equilibrium.  Society is an open, living, and complex system 
that has a primary characteristic to maintain a dynamic equilibrium.  It self regulates in 
order to balance social forces, keeping the system within an acceptable range of dynamic 
equilibrium.  The primary balance of forces for a social system is between the value and 
the environment components of a society.   
The society as a system must adjust to the inputs made to it and as we have 
suggested these inputs can be endogenous or exogenous.  The importance of this to 
counterterrorism is that terrorism can be analyzed as an input to the system.  This input 




political violence, is that it is a violent alteration of the environment that conflicts with 
the value component and thus creates an instantaneous imbalance or some degree of 
disequilibrium.   
Dynamic equilibrium is a normal system characteristic to counter this partial or 
relative disequilibrium.  We are not suggesting that terrorist groups or leaders understand 
and purposefully leverage this knowledge in the context discussed here.  Osama Bin 
Laden never sat in Kandahar and told Mohamed Atta to create an “environment-value 
mismatch.”  Based on this property of dynamic equilibrium, DETT explains how 
terrorism works, why terrorism is unique, and why it is so hard to understand at non-
systems levels of analysis.   
Terrorism is perceived to be an effective tool by some because it almost always 
results in some observable change.  Terrorism is a physical input to the system 
environment at immediate odds with collective values that plays upon the characteristic 
of dynamic equilibrium with the intent to force some level of social change.  Dynamic 
equilibrium is critical to understanding how terrorism forces (or hopes to force) change 
because it is the system characteristic that manages change and can result in 
disequilibrium.  A terrorist act or the repeated use of terrorism to imbalance the system 
can lead to system disequilibrium or a need for structural or functional changes in the 
system.  The state of disequilibrium will be further explained in the next section.  If the 
characteristic of equilibrium can be purposefully leveraged or disrupted, an exogenous 
actor has the ability to create significant perturbation and potentially even disequilibrium 
in the targeted system.   
The often quoted Supreme Court commentary regarding pornography “I don’t 
know what it is, but I know it when I see it” is also applicable to terrorism.  Terrorism is 
an act that creates a system imbalance and that imbalance has an almost instinctive feel.  
We see the environment and we feel collective value.  An act in the environment is felt to 
be in accordance with or at odds with our values.   
At the individual level of analysis, this leads to the subjective nature of terms like 
illegitimate violence and terrorism or “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-
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fighter.”  At the individual level each person’s vale-environment perception is different.  
However, at the social system level of analysis, there is a collective value that can be 
identified.  If we can identify this collective value and define the environment of a 
particular system, we should be able to study the state of equilibrium.  If we can measure 
equilibrium and understand the impact of terrorist inputs to that system, we should be 
capable of gauging the impact of terrorism on a society before, during, and after it occurs.  
A note on disequilibrium is required before we continue.               
3.   Disequilibrium.  System changes occur when some degree of partial or 
relative disequilibrium occurs.  Since total equilibrium is impossible in a social system, 
relative disequilibrium and thus change, are continuous and healthy.  Most disparities in 
dynamic equilibrium are minor so normal system processes can mange the needed 
changes.  When routine changes occur within the existing mechanisms of the system, no 
significant structural or organizational changes are required to restore balance. 
The question then arises; at what point does this imbalance result in a level of 
disequilibrium when significant changes occur?  Disequilibrium is a continuum not a 
certain breaking point.  Say for example we where to measure dynamic equilibrium on a 
scale of 1 – 100.  100 is perfect equilibrium which is unrealistic to achieve for any 
amount of time and 1 is complete disequilibrium.  All living systems function within this 
range.  The characteristic of dynamic equilibrium as defined in this thesis drives the 
system to change and try to achieve a rating of 100.  The lower it goes, the more system 
changes are needed to restore balance.  A rating of 20 may indicate a serious state of 
relative disequilibrium but it has not reached true disequilibrium.  The chart below 
illustrates this idea.  As an example, this chart tracks the equilibrium of a social system 
over a three year period.  For each year, five variables are charted.  The environment, the 
value, overall equilibrium, disequilibrium, and pressure exerted on the system to change.  
As changes occur over the three years, equilibrium is calculated as the percentage of 




















2005 75 55 .73 .27 Medium 
2006 (+10) 85 (+2) 53 .62 .38 High  
2007 (-15) 70 (+10) 63 .90 .10 Low 
Figure 9.   Sample Equilibrium Calculation  
As equilibrium increases, disequilibrium decreases and thus lowers the pressure 
for change within the system.  In this example, 38% disequilibrium existed in 2006 and a 
greater pressure for the system to change.  Altering either (or both) the environment or 
the value variable can trigger an imbalance and increases the pressure to change.  This 
same formula will be revisited in Chapter V.   
Indicators of disequilibrium are major upheavals or dysfunction in the system that 
prevents or inhibits normal operations.  Disequilibrium is recognized when the normal 
mechanisms for change no longer function as a homeostatic mechanism of restoration 
(driving the system back towards 100).  Disequilibrium can lead to system death or major 
structural changes.  Changes that occur at this level of dysfunction are revolutionary and 
not evolutionary.  Violence is almost certain at this level of disequilibrium.  This 
condition may materialize as a failed state, revolution, or even civil war.   
This thesis is not attempting to explain the causes of terrorism, revolution, or state 
failure but simply identify a working understanding of the notion of social system 
disequilibrium.  Disequilibrium is defined as a state of extreme value-environment 
imbalance that can not be regulated by the existing mechanisms of a social system.   
A society may recover from disequilibrium but will be structurally and 
functionally a different system.  To avoid this state, it may be possible to measure the 
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level of relative disequilibrium and manage it before it reaches total disequilibrium.  
Creating disequilibrium in an opponent’s system could be an effective strategy to force 
change.   
Up until this point, this thesis has addressed social change rather abstractly.  The 
following section will talk more specifically to how a system changes or reacts to 
dynamic equilibrium.                         
4.  System Changes.  The process and types of changes that occur within a 
system vary based on different levels within the system.  Analyzing the process of change 
within a system as complex as society without making a distinction between these levels 
could result in analytical confusion.  For our purposes, the distinction between only two 
general levels for analysis is necessary.  Each level has a different process for change.  
The individual/group level of society changes differently than at the system level.  
a. Individual and Group. Individuals are the smallest human component of 
the system.  They act as individual agents who are intricately connected to other 
components and sub systems of society.  Individuals form groups or organizations.  At 
the individual and group level, when our environment does not correspond to how we 
believe the environment should be (values) we have four options.   
1. Change the environment and bring our physical condition as close to 
our values as possible. 
2. Change our values.  This may be an unconscious change, simply 
accepting that you cannot achieve the standards you have set. 
3. A combination of both 1 and 2. 
4. Do nothing. 
The decision process to choose one these options and the means to achieve 
change are different for individuals and groups, but can still be categorized by these four 
choices.  Behavioral psychology and the study of organizational behavior are fields that 
would deal more specifically with these individual choices and actions.   
Individuals and groups make these decisions based on preferences or pressures at 
that level of analysis.  Voting is an example of individual and group actions taken to 
change the environment.  Sixty four percent of the voting-age public chose to vote in the 
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2004 presidential election.88  That leaves a third of the population that chose not to make 
individual value inputs into the system.  At the individual and group level, if a value-
environment imbalance exists and nothing is done to correct equilibrium, dissatisfaction 
or frustration will build.  Ted Robert Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, discussed in 
Chapter II best describes this process and its potential outcomes.  The greater the value-
environment mismatch, the greater the individual or group frustration and the 
corresponding potential for violence.  There are many factors that would increase or 
decrease frustration but ultimately at this level of analysis, there is a conscious choice on 
what actions to take.  This is not the case when analyzing how change occurs at the 
system level of analysis.                    
b.  System Level of Analysis.  The primary difference at the system level of 
analysis from the individual/group level of analysis is that of conscious choice.  
Individuals and groups are subcomponents of the system.  The system is governed by 
structure, functional relationships, system properties, and the dynamics of its 
components.  There is no system level conscious choice.   
The social system has the same four responses as individuals when relative 
disequilibrium exits but the society (as a single entity) does not make these individual 
decisions consciously thinking about the overall health of the system.  The reader should 
not infer that the system has some capability for rational choice independent of its 
components.  The “choices” of a social system are the collective choices (inputs) of its 
components, governed by system properties and characteristics.  At the system level, 
changes are not an automatic process, they are a series of system component choices 
(inputs) steered by system characteristics governed by system properties.  Over time, as a 
social system evolves, societies develop mechanisms to deal with certain routine inputs 
and changes.  These mechanisms can also become outdated.  As the system continues to 
evolve, new mechanisms are needed and old ones loose their relevance.  The American 
political process has evolved over time and has proven to be a resilient and effective 
mechanism to regulate peaceful political change.   
                                                 
88 U.S. Census Bureau, “Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004,” (2006), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (accessed 12 October 2007).  
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If the system does not correct an imbalance, and the environment-value moves 
increasingly to disequilibrium, system level pressures or frustrations will build.  This 
social friction impacts the systems ability to regulate normal operations as a society.  This 
relative disequilibrium of forces may be characterized by a decrease in productivity, 
increased social unrest, increasingly divided communities, and a host of other symptoms.  
These symptoms are sometimes seen as causal to violence or terrorism when in fact they 
are more accurately signs of a relatively disequalized system.  As a system slips into 
greater disequilibrium, the inputs needed to re equalize the system will be more radical 
and potentially violent.  The type of change that occurs is dependent on the system and 
more specifically, the mechanisms for change that exist within the system. When those 
mechanisms no longer function to manage homeostatic change… the system is in true 
disequilibrium.   
5. Speed of Inputs Matter.   Most social systems have mechanisms to 
regulate or govern change.  These mechanisms set or develop a tempo for change.  Since 
each system and its mechanisms are unique, so is the process and speed by which they 
handle inputs and manage change.  An important characteristic in our modern world is 
that the number and speed of system inputs are growing at a rapid rate.  If a system 
cannot handle the volume or speed of these inputs, the system may not be capable of 
compensating quickly enough.  In this case, even if the mechanisms that govern change 
are functioning, they may become increasingly overwhelmed.  The system may be 
actively functioning to restore equilibrium but still in danger of slipping gradually into 
greater relative disequilibrium.  Modern, open societies require mechanisms of social 
change that not only handle inputs but regulate the system in a timely manner.  Flexible 
systems that evolve quickly are more likely to adapt to this increasing speed.  Again, the 
American system is a good example.  It is designed to evolve fast because it 
accommodates the value component instead of controlling it like other forms of 
governance.  Change and adaptability are built into the system.  Systems that cannot 
process inputs at a speed equal to or greater than they are received may become 
dysfunctional.   
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The speed of exogenous system inputs seems relevant to the globalization theory 
of conflict.  Globalization is generally understood to be a spread of western ideas into 
foreign cultures brought about by modern telecommunications and global based 
economies.  Some argue that the intrusion of western cultures or “civilization” into more 
traditional systems has resulted in increased global conflict.  This globalization theory 
may in fact be viewed in systems terms.  Globalization may in fact not be an issue of 
western influence but instead be a simultaneous problem of increasingly fast exogenous 
inputs and traditionally slow fragile systems.  Traditional civilizations are systems.  If 
they have not evolved or adapted to process an increased flow and rate of exogenous 
inputs, the system may become overwhelmed and thus move towards disequilibrium.  
The conflict attributed to globalization may in fact be an indicator of system value-
environment imbalance and the process of social change occurring at a more rapid pace 
(and thus observable) than ever before.  Globalization has been offered as a causal 
explanation for the rise of Al Qaeda and other militant traditionalists but given this 
systems framework, they can be seen as a result of system disequilibrium or dysfunction.  
Al Qaeda and their ilk are trying to preserve, revive, and spread a system that simply does 
not work.    
Puritanical Islam as a political - social system does not work because it is 
structurally incapable of change and adaptation.  This commentary is not concerning 
Islam as a religion which like other religions plays a crucial role in shaping a system’s 
values.  Islamic influenced government systems are and have been capable of success as 
systems but this commentary concerns Islam as a social system and form of government.  
Any generalization about a subject as diverse as Islam is dangerous so these comments 
are specific to puritanical versions of Islam, preached by radical political activists’ such 
as Al Qaeda.  The brand of Islam promoted by Al Qaeda is ideologically against change 
or adaptation.  Its adherents believe it is Allah’s will and thus perfect.  Any attempt to 
change this ideology or system is an attempt to subvert Allah’s will.  Not all Islamic 
doctrine is so unchanging.  Many Muslims believe in ijtihad, or the Islamic scholarly 
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process of adopting Islamic beliefs to changing times and circumstances.89  The Salafists 
however believe that ijtihad is no longer possible.  These puritanical views of Islam 
espoused by Islamists outlaw the application of human reason to holy texts and law 
which govern the structure and function of the system.  As a result, they advocate a 
medieval system be applied in modern times without system adaptation.  This brand of 
Islam as a system can be considered closed-inflexible.  It is a system designed to resist 
social evolution.  Islam as a medieval doctrine is designed to be static and purposely 
inflexible as a form of social control.  An inflexible system can function if inputs are 
limited, as seen in the North Korea example but when the inputs can not longer be 
controlled, an inflexible system may be more inclined to dysfunction.  Like all social 
organisms, Islam has of course evolved over time but at a more gradual pace than more 
modern forms of governance.  Islamist rhetoric well illustrates the reluctance to any 
modern changes at all.  
Today however, with the global proliferation of media, internet, and free markets 
it is nearly impossible to maintain a closed system.  Short of total physical control such as 
in North Korea, traditional systems are increasingly transitioning from closed to open 
systems.  Therefore, traditional systems that were once able to function as closed-
inflexible systems are now transitioning to open-inflexible systems.  Al Qaeda’s perfect 
Islamic system is now an open-inflexible system.  The system can no longer control the 
rate of speed of exogenous inputs.  Medieval Islam is a system designed to fight against 
the characteristics of all living systems… openness and change.  We are not suggesting 
that evolution within an Islamic system equates the adoption of “western” values or even 
the form of any recognizable existing government, but simply that to fight social change 
is a losing battle.  As a system, Islam could currently be categorized as in disequilibrium 
or close to it.  It will either die as a social system (not as a religion) or undergo some 
fundamental system change to restore itself.  This revolutionary process of change could 
be considered an impending “re-formation” of the Islamic system.   
                                                 
89 Mary R. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy; Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 10. 
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Globalization may be the modern phenomena of transitioning systems from 
closed to open at the same time the speed and rate of exogenous inputs is rapidly 
increasing for everyone.  Flexible systems are more likely to adapt and survive.  
Governments who fail to recognize this and implement policy according will eventually 
find themselves governing systems in disequilibrium.      
 6.  Roles of Governments.  Politics and the government are mechanisms 
created to control the social system.  There are many types of governments but in general 
they are a system mechanism that possesses the power to regulate the rest of the system.  
In the context of the value-environment construct, governments have the role to restore or 
maintain dynamic equilibrium.  The government, or a legitimate authority, of that 
particular social system is charged with maintaining the health of the system.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, this role comes with control over the use of force.  Governments 
manage the system by using the same process of inputs into both the value and 
environment components.    
Many of the inputs made into the system by various endogenous and exogenous 
agents conflict.  This results in a routine battle of inputs.   Figure 10 graphically 
represents this process.  In this illustration, the government makes system inputs to 
maintain system balance while external agents make system inputs from outside the 
system boundaries.  This results in an iterative process of input and counter input.  In this 
example the government, as a component of the system, does not have direct control over 
the endogenous actors who exist outside the system boundary.  DETT is specifically 
concerned with this struggle between the legitimate authority and external actors who use 
terrorism.  As terrorists try to create a relative disequilibrium, the government tries to do 
two things.  They must try to stop the inputs from occurring and manage the dynamic 
equilibrium of the system. 
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Figure 10.   Government Versus External Agent Inputs  
 
If a government does not recognize this dynamic process, it is in danger of 
enacting policies (making endogenous inputs) that further imbalance the value-
environment relationship.  Government changes to the environment that appear 
productive may in fact imbalance the system even more.  This is one of the reasons that a 
democratic system of government is far less vulnerable to terrorism.  Democracy, as a 
relatively open system results in greater susceptibility to the act of terrorism but 
flexibility limits its overall effect.  Mature and functioning democratic governments are 
designed around a feedback loop from the population.  This feedback informs the 
government on what system inputs are necessary.  A democracy essentially tells the 
government what the collective value is and what they want the environment to look like.  
As in the security to civil liberties example discussed previously at Figure 6, the 
components or agents inform the government what system changes they will and will not 
accept.90  The system has a direct feedback mechanism to the management of the system.   
                                                 
90 Figure 6 depicted a recent Pew Center survey that found a split in American beliefs regarding 
security and civil liberties.  Feedback from the population to the government is critical in a democratic 
system.  
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This feedback loop may not exist in other forms of government or less mature 
democracies whose feedback loops are not functioning.  Democracy as a functioning 
system is far different from a democracy in name only.  Other forms of government are 
left to make decisions and system inputs without the benefit of a value feedback loop.  
The implications on government counterterrorism policy development are profound.   
To counter the terrorist inputs of an external actor, the government may not have 
to respond to the specific terrorist act.  All government counterterrorism policies should 
at least consider system maintenance of dynamic equilibrium.  If government actions 
destabilize the system over the long term, are the short term benefits of those policies 
worth it?  Terrorism is effective because it attacks directly at the system level, forcing 
some degree of disequilibrium.  If government counterterrorism measures create further 
relative disequilibrium, the terrorists will achieve social change.   
G.  CONCLUSION   
The preceding material outlined the dynamic equilibrium theory of terrorism.  
DETT is a systems approach to understanding the system level impact of terrorism on a 
society.  This approach provides insights as to how terrorism works and how a 
government can react more effectively.  Terrorism is a tactic that is chosen because it is 
perceived to work as a tool for social/political change.  It is a violent input to the 
environment at immediate and recognizable odds with a system’s values and as such 
decreases the equilibrium between the two.  It increases the level of disequilibrium but 
does not necessarily result in true disequilibrium.  The incongruence of this relative 
disequilibrium between the value-environment components can be measured.  A sample 
scale of 1-100 was used in this chapter and will be further explored in Chapter V.  
The homeostatic characteristic of dynamic equilibrium then tends to drive 
changes within the social system in an effort to restore this value-environment 
equilibrium.  The greater the disequilibrium, the more changes may be required.  
Therefore, terrorism can induce political/social change by targeting social system 
equilibrium.     
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Terrorism works to spur changes in social systems but rarely achieves its intended 
objectives.  Every system is unique and thus, inputs of terror may force change easily in 
one system but not in another.  For this reason, each society and government will be 
impacted by and respond to similar types of terrorism differently. A resilient social 
system designed to adapt quickly, is less vulnerable to terror inputs.  Each system is 
unique but with a clear understanding of the system and the use of DETT, it may be 
possible to predict how certain terrorism inputs may impact the system and thus which 
counterterrorism policies will be effective.  This process is represented as a process in 
Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11.   DETT Process 
If this input of terrorism moves the system too far out of equilibrium, 
disequilibrium may occur.  A state of disequilibrium exists when the system cannot 
function using its existing structure or organization.  In this situation, the mechanisms 
that normally govern change are no longer adequate to equalize the system.  Recovery 
from disequilibrium will result in structural or functional changes that may result in a 
fundamentally different system.  Disequilibrium will most likely be associated with 
socially motivated violence.       
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DETT can be a useful tool to understand social system change and how terrorism 
works.  This chapter concludes the theoretical explanation.  An analysis using terrorism 
inputs and data is now required to demonstrate the theories usefulness.     
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V. AL QAEDA, 9/11, AND THE AMERICAN DYNAMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
1.  Testing the Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism (DETT).  The 
DETT was developed in an attempt to understand the impact of terrorism on a social 
system and in so doing help us to implement more effective counter-terrorism policies.  
This chapter will use Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks to assess the theory’s validity.   
This chapter will initially identify Al Qaeda’s three strategic objectives in order to 
examine how the attacks of 9/11 were intended to achieve their most immediate and 
(minimal) goal.  Al Qaeda intended to change American policy by disrupting the 
American social system equilibrium.  This chapter will then analyze the impact of 9/11 
on the American system in order to demonstrate the validity of dynamic equilibrium and 
DETT as a useful analytical framework.  
2.  Analysis.  The tremendous complexity of the U.S. social system 
necessitates our analysis to focus on a variety of important easily observable sub 
equilibriums. Specifically, this chapter will divide the overall U.S, social system 
equilibrium into: 
• Economic sub equilibrium 
• Government sub equilibrium 
• National security sub equilibrium. 
This analysis will then demonstrate how the environmental input of the 9/11 
attacks impacted system equilibrium and how the system responded.  This analysis uses 
polling data to illustrate the changing relationship between values and environment in the 
equilibriums of the three subsystems in question. These phases will then be analyzed and 
compared to determine the impact of 9/11 on overall system equilibrium. 
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This chapter includes an empirical assessment of equilibrium at certain points in 
time.  This assessment was needed to analyze the general state of equilibrium pre and 
post 9/11 in order to validate the central arguments of DETT.  These empirical 
assessments are based on data and changes in data but were assessed specifically to chart 
the general state of equilibrium.  The specific numerical assessment should be given less 
weight than the general state and trend of changes.  The general formula that guided this 
assessment conceptually is shown at Table 1 below.   This table describes an equation 
used to determine numeric value for equilibrium.  The environment (E) is assessed a 
value of 1-100.  Likewise, the value (V) component is assessed a separate value from 1-
100.91  Equilibrium is then calculated as V/E or simply the percentage of V that 
corresponds to E.  Disequilibrium (DEQ) is the percentage of V that does not equal E.  
Once a value has been assesses for EQ and DEQ, they can then be graphed to determine 
change as seen in the sample chart at Figure 12.   













Pre 9/11 100 75 .75 .25 
9/11 100 60 .60 .40 
Post 9/11 100 60 .70 .30 
 
                                                 
91 Noticeably missing from this equation or analysis is an explanation or criteria for that V or E 
assessment.  This criterion is not part of this thesis and not used here but would be specific to the system 
being examined and the intent of the research.  This chapter is an effort to only chart changes in general 
equilibrium and not establish a scientific equation and assign definitive values.    
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Figure 12.   Sample Equilibrium Change Chart  
This equation is used in this chapter to analyze and graph equilibrium changes.  
The general state and changes in equilibrium are necessary here, not the specific value 
assigned to each variable, for purposes of demonstrating the validity of social equilibrium 
theory and thus DETT.   
One of the primary data sources for this analysis is Pew Center polling and survey 
data.  Poling data allows certain assertions on equilibrium to be made without a detailed 
empirical analysis of the E variable.  Specifically here, public attitude surveys are used as 
direct indicators of value to environment agreement. These Pew Center products 
represent the public agreement with a specific issue in the environment.  Instead of 
deriving equilibrium data by calculating V/E, polling data presents an approximation of 
this balance as “XX% of population agree/disagree with…” or XX% of V = E.   If used 
correctly, polling data can act as an indicator of approximate equilibrium and 
disequilibrium levels.  Multiple sets of polling data are used to examine, graph, and 





For this analysis, the data are then grouped into three time periods: 
• Pre 9/11 (to establish a base for analysis) 
• Immediately after 9/11 (to determine immediate impact) 
• After 9/11 (to determine a “lasting impact”)  
These sets of data will be arranged to show a numerical change for each sub 
equilibrium over time.  They will then be combined and charted to determine the 
approximate state of American dynamic equilibrium before, during, and after 9/11.   
Pre 9/11 data ranges from 1999 to early September 2001.  Immediately after 9/11 
utilizes data from September 2001 until approximately September 2002.  Data from 
September 2002 – spring 2003 are lumped together to generalize the lasting impact of 
9/11.  It was decided to partition the data of this last phase to end at the onset of the Iraq 
War.  The purpose of this analysis is to determine the 9/11 effect on equilibrium and thus 
social change; it was assumed that data points after the Iraq invasion could potentially 
skew the analysis.  As a significant emotional national event, the Iraq war has altered 
both system values and environment is ways unrelated to 9/11.  Any national polling data 
after the invasion of Iraqi concerning the government, military, national security, or 
economics is likely to be effected.     
B. AL QAEDA’S STATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
Al Qaeda is more than merely a terrorist group and the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) is more than a war against the acts of terror.  Rather, Al Qaeda is the self 
appointed vanguard for a global Salafist insurgency with global aims and a long term 
strategy.  They are a violent Islamic right-wing radical activist organization.  As radicals 
they are inclined to use any means, too include terrorism, to achieve their religious 
political objectives.   
The failure to properly identify and distinguish between Al Qaeda’s different 





discuss their strategic objectives.  These objectives can be categorized as minimal, 
intermediate and maximal and have important implications to their short, mid, and long 
term objectives.92   
1.  Minimal:  The Islamist’s most immediate and minimal objective is to 
“liberate” territory from governments that they view as apostate.  The specific territory to 
be freed varies by group or cause but Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden strive to “free” all 
majority Muslim countries from non Islamic governments.  Bin Laden is particularly 
interested in the control of his native Saudi Arabia while al-Zawahiri is concerned with 
his native Egypt.  Al Qaeda’s minimal objective is regional but they believe attacks 
against the West can further those objectives.  They view America as propping up 
“puppet” governments in the region.  In order to remove these “puppet” governments, 
Bin Laden believes he must sever them from their American support.      
Bin Laden has been very clear about his immediate objectives and the intent of 
9/11.  In his 2002 Why We Are Fighting You, Bin Laden explains exactly what he intends 
to achieve in the short term.  He instructs Americans that we should stop supporting 
Israel, withdraw from “his lands”, stop supporting “corrupt” regimens or else his 
mujahedin will bring the fight to American shores.  Al Qaeda wants the United States out 
of the Middle East so his ilk can take religious, political, and social control to institute 
sharia law (more specifically his puritanical brand of Sunni Islam).  The impact on 
America would include the eventual destruction of Israel, abandoning all secular regional 
allies, severing all financial ties to the region, and allowing human rights disasters of 
biblical proportions.   
Al Qaeda’s minimal objective is regional but to achieve this they view terrorism 
against western targets as an effective strategy.  During this phase, attacking the “far 
enemy” (America and Europe) are means to weaken regional targets such as Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt.  Specifically, Bin Laden intends is to disrupt the American economic 
equilibrium.  The direct financial damage caused by terrorism attacks is relatively minor 
                                                 
92 Jeffrey M. Bale, “Al-Qa‘ida’s ‘Strategic Thinking’: An Illustrative Example of the Impact of 
Ideological Extremism on Terrorist ‘Rationality’” (unpublished manuscript, Monterey Terrorism Research 
and Education Program Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, 2007).  
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but the indirect costs in lost business, consumer confidence, and increased spending can 
be enormous and thus the real danger to system equilibrium.  Therefore it is the system’s 
economic response to terrorism and not terrorism itself that threatens economic 
equilibrium.    
Terrorism is coercive because we fear future attacks.  The potential future attacks 
are why we do not fly after a hijacking or invest in the stock market after an attack on 
Wall Street.  By demonstrating a capability to strike us domestically and promising future 
attacks, Al Qaeda’s strategy to achieve its immediate/minimal objective is to coerce the 
American economic system.  Osama Bin Laden believes that if he can disrupt our 
economic equilibrium, the system will respond with a change in policy that favors his 
regional objectives.      
2.  Intermediate: Al Qaeda’s intermediate strategic objective is to recover all 
territory once under Muslim rule.93  Muslim geographic control peaked in the 1500s 
when it stretched across North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Northern India, 
Spain, Italy, and portions of China.  Once Al Qaeda secures an Islamist sanctuary in the 
Middle East, they intend to move against these “lost Muslim” lands.  Although the United 
States is not directly threatened geographically by this intermediate objective, any Al 
Qaeda progress toward it would obviously be unacceptable to the international 
community. 
3.  Maximal:  Al Qaeda’s ultimate goal is global -- the restoration of the 
caliph.  No matter how unrealistic it may seem from a western perspective, Al Qaeda’s 
long term objective is a global Islamic theocracy.  Bin Laden is careful to not publicize 
these objectives too clearly to westerners but is very open about these objectives in his 
Arab writings:  
Muslims are obligated to raid the lands of the infidels, occupy them, and 
exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system, barring any 
practice that contradicts sharia from being publicly voiced among the 
people, as was the case at the dawn of Islam.94   
                                                 
93 Bale, 20.  
94 Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway, 2007), 51. 
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Although the realization of these objectives is seemingly impossible, it is 
important for us to understand the strategic objectives of our enemy as we analyze their 
tactics.  The attacks of 9/11 were conducted to disrupt the American equilibrium and thus 
further Al Qaeda’s minimal or short term objectives.  Al Qaeda’s minimal objectives are 
the most immediate to counterterrorism policy but we must also consider the longer term 
objectives.  A truly effective policy stymies both short and long term objectives.  A 
policy that defeats Al Qaeda in the short term but facilities their longer, more 
intermediate objectives is not a successful policy.  This is an area where general systems 
thinking and DETT can be of value.  It can be used to understand the longer term system 
dynamics and unintended consequences of certain policies.    
C.  ECONOMIC SUB-EQUILIBRIUM.   
1.  Economic Sub-Equilibrium. The American economy is Al Qaeda’s 
primary target.  They intend to disrupt the dynamic equilibrium between the economic 
environment and the system’s economic value or beliefs.  Al Qaeda believes that by 
creating disequilibrium between the two, the system will be forced to make policy 
changes to restore this balance.  In their eyes, America’s center of gravity is its economy.  
Bin Laden believes that Americans cherish money and luxury over all other things and if 
he can damage our economy, the American public will demand withdrawal from the 
Middle East.   This section will first examine the pre 9/11 economic sub equilibrium in 
order to establish a baseline for comparison.  Once a baseline is established, we can 
compare how 9/11 impacted this equilibrium over the short as well as longer term.  
2.  America’s Pre 9/11 Economic Sub-Equilibrium.  In the late 1990s the 
American economy was strong.  Fueled by a high tech boom, the American economy was 
growing at a record pace.  However, beginning in 2000 there was a realization that the 
economy was overheated and much of the publicly traded high tech companies 
responsible for the boon were largely overvalued.  In late 2000 and early 2001, before 




indicators point to different start points of the actual “recession” but all indicators show 
that the economy was on a downward turn before 9/11.  The “dot.com” bust in March 
2000 was the most likely starting point.   
The 2000 government budget was a staggering $1.8 trillion. In 2000, the per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) was $35,314.  By all financial measurements 
America was a financial juggernaut and Americans enjoyed a very high standard of 
living.  However, although the economic environment was superb, equilibrium is 
measured as a balance with the value component.  The high standard of living and record 
profits also impacted expectations.  Americans expected record profits and thus any 
downward movement in the economic environment would trigger some degree of value-
environment imbalance.  Prior to 9/11 the American economy had already experienced 
several quarters of negative economic indicators.  Even during this time of historic wealth 
only 68% of Americans surveyed agreed that they were “pretty well satisfied” with the 
way things are going for them financially.    
The pre 9/11 economic environment was superb but beginning a downward turn 
while economic values were in flux.  The economic value-environment relationship is 
assessed to be a 90% prior o 9/11 as illustrated at Table 2.95  The economy was 
historically strong in the late 90’s and by 2001 the per capita GDP was still historically 
high.   













Pre 9/11 100 90 .90 .10 
 
                                                 
95 Survey data reflects a 68% satisfaction but this indicator dealt specifically with “individual” and not 
collective satisfaction.  An analytical assessment was made to adjust the overall V/E ratio by 20% to 
account for agreement not identified in this polling data.     
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This leaves a small level of disequilibrium (.10) but this was on the rise as 9/11 
got closer.  Values were rising to meet the new economic environment at the same time 
when the economy began to cool and then begin a downward slide.  Al Qaeda’s timing 
was excellent.  
3.  Immediate Impact of 9/11 on Economic Sub-Equilibrium.  The actual 
attacks of 9/11 had significant immediate impact.  The immediate direct costs of the 
attack were estimated at $27.2 billion.  These costs included the destruction of assets, 
rescue operations, and immediate clean up costs.96   Moreover there were considerable 
Indirect costs resulting from the closure of financial markets and national airspace.  
Airspace closed until 13 September and the lack of airline passenger confidence resulted 
in airline federal funding “bailouts” as numerous airlines tilted on the brink of 
bankruptcy.  
The economic forecast was immediately downgraded.  Experts expected GDP to 
drop .5% for 2001 and a significant 1.2% through 2003 for an estimated loss of half a 
trillion dollars.97  As expected, GDP did decrease in the third quarter. The physical 
attacks on 9/11 altered the economic environment and immediately caused a degree of 
disequilibrium.  It had significant initial impact but no where near as damaging as Al 
Qaeda had hoped or economists initially predicted.  Amazingly, against expert forecasts 
and Al Qaeda’s desires, GDP rose in the fourth quarter of 2001. 
The system responded to the environment change, limited the economic impact, 
and prevented the system from greater economic disequilibrium.  The government 
responded swiftly (and in hindsight, correctly) with “good economic crisis 
management.”98   Immediate counter measures included value inputs to restore public 
confidence and environment inputs in the form of lower interest rates, liquidity, and 
increased government spending.  By the end of 2001, 66% of Americans surveyed agreed 
                                                 
96 Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the Attacks of 9/11,” 
Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 (2002), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp. (accessed 25 
November 2007). 
97 Looney. 
98 Looney . 
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that they were “pretty well satisfied.” This was only a 2% drop in economic satisfaction 
after the worst terrorist attack in our nation’s history.  Immediately after 9/11, the 
economic equilibrium is assessed to have dipped to a value of 80.  This value was 
assessed as an initial 20% drop based on direct costs of 9/11, a drop in consumer 
confidence, the drop in GDP, and population survey data.  However, the government 
response which resulted in airline solvency and a recovered GDP prior to the end of this 
time phase resulted in only a 10% drop.99  Although the initial dip may have been lower, 
immediate economic counter inputs saved the overall rating for this period of time.      













Pre 9/11 100 90 .90 .10 
9/11 100 80 .80 .20 
 
September 11 was a shock to the economic system.  The initial shock created 
some disequilibrium but government counter inputs quickly limited the level of 
disequilibrium that occurred.    
4.  Lasting Effects on Economic Sub-Equilibrium The longer term effects 
of 9/11 may not be definitively calculable.  The economy is intertwined with many 
diverse variables and inputs not related to 9/11 which impacted the economic sub 
equilibrium.  However, enough evidence exists to asses a general state of equilibrium.   
Today, the 2007 gross domestic product for 3rd quarter is an estimated $13,926.7 
trillion while the federal budget alone is $2.66 trillion. Today’s American standard of 
living is high, boasting an estimated $43,500 per capita GDP.  Add to these numbers a  
 
                                                 
99 These are the authors own analytical estimates. 
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steady 4.8% unemployment rate and a low inflation rate of 2.5% and most indicators 
show a healthy economic environment.  By all measures, the system responded well and 
the post 9/11 economic environment is positive.   
GDP per capita is a good data set to determine changes economic environment.  
Figure 1 lists the changes in per capita GDP from 1999 to 2005.  These data are adjusted 
to 2002 dollars to better graph the true changes without being skewed by inflation.  The 
graph demonstrates that the economic environment was rising until early 2001 and then 
began to dip.  9/11 resulted in a decrease in GDP decrease for only a short time until mid 
2002.  The per capita GDP then leveled and began a steady climb which continues into 
2005.        
 
Figure 13.   Real Per Capita GDP (adjusted using 2002 dollars)100 
Even though per capita GDP can represent a healthy economic environment, 
equilibrium is based on the value-environment relationship.  While the economic 
environment was improving in 2002 and 2003, the system’s attitude toward the 
                                                 
100 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Comparative Real Gross Domestic Product 
per Capita and per Employed Person.” U.S., Office of Productivity and Technology (2007),  
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ForeignLabor/flsgdp.txt (accessed 13 September 2007). 
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environment was not.  As illustrated at Figure 14, in 1999 68% of Americans surveyed 
agreed that they were “pretty well satisfied” with their own economic situation.  In 2002 
that percentage fell 2% to 66%.101  This can easily be explained by the immediate 
economic impact and flattening GDP numbers post 9/11.  However, Figure 14 also shows 
that in 2003 while the per capita GDP was improving, only 63% of Americans surveyed 
agreed that they were “pretty well satisfied” with their own economic situation.102   
 
 
Figure 14.   National Economic Satisfaction  
The economic environment was improving but the attitudes of collective 
economic value were not.  There were many complex economic variables that play into 
this; most notably the recession that began in late 2000 and ended in 2003 but 9/11 
certainly had a hand in creating some degree of economic disequilibrium.  
 
                                                 
101 The Pew Research Center; For the People and The Press, Trends in Political Values and Core 
Attitudes: 1987-2007 (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2007). 
102 The Pew Research Center. 
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5.   9/11s Impact of the Economic Sub Equilibrium.  By 2003 the physical 
economy had recovered from the recession and impact of 9/11.  However, the collective 
system economic value had not.  It is still a very healthy level of equilibrium.   Al Qaeda 
was successful in causing some immediate economic impact but the system responded 
effectively to mitigate the immediate impact and eventually improved the economic 
environment.  Table 4 illustrates the numeric assessment of equilibrium.  Prior to 9/11 the 
economic equilibrium was assessed as 90 based on a strong economy and general 
economic satisfaction.  After 9/11 economic equilibrium dipped to an estimated value 80 
during the months after 9/11, and then rebounded slightly.103  The post 9/11 value is 
assessed as 85 indicating a slight rise, but as of 2003 the system had not fully adjusted to 
pre 9/11 equilibrium levels.   













Pre 9/11 100 90 .90 .10 
9/11 100 80 .80 .20 
Post 9/11 100 85 .85 .15 
 
Al Qaeda was partially successful in their efforts to change economic equilibrium 
over the longer term. This analysis must be combined with other sub component 
equilibriums to determine the overall effect of 9/11 on total system equilibrium.   
                                                 
103 These values were assessed by looking at a broad range of economic data and surveys.  These 
assessed values are not a direct correlation to data but instead this analysis’ estimate of overall economic 
behavior and public (value) attitudes to that environment.  A much more detailed assessment would be 
required beyond the scope of this paper to establish an equation to assess specific economic equilibrium.  
These are estimates of overall behavior.     
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D. GOVERNMENT SUB-EQUILIBRIUM. 
 1. Government Sub Equilibrium.  The government is both a system 
component and a system driver.  It acts as the system maintainer.  As a democratic 
system, the American Government is highly sensitive to feedback from the population (or 
other components of the system) and uses this feedback to govern the system.  The 
government sub equilibrium is a balance between what the government does (or is) and 
how the system believes it should do (or be).  The structure and mechanisms of the 
American government system will not be reviewed here, the following section is only 
concerned with examining the state and changes in system value-environment 
relationship as a result of 9/11.   
2.  Pre 9/11 Government Sub-Equilibrium. The government sub 
equilibrium is inherently in flux.  Its very structure, the activism of our population, 
amplified by modern media makes for a fast paced, reactive, and changing system.  At 
the individual level this may appear chaotic and dysfunctional but is a desirable quality 
for a social system’s survival over time.  Since the value component is inherently a 
collective sentiment, public opinion polls are a good way to gauge the government sub 
equilibrium.  However, most polling data focuses on specific political issues or 
personnel, not on the government sub component as a whole.  Therefore, this section 
used poll data on multiple government mechanisms to asses the state of equilibrium.104         
One set of polling data useful for our purposes is election and voting data.  In the 
2000 Presidential election, 129,549 million people or 69.5% of the eligible population 
were registered to vote.  Of that, 110,826 citizens or 59.5% of the total eligible 
population (85.5% of those registered) actually voted.  The percentage of a population 
that registers to vote may indicate confidence that the government system can change via 
normal system mechanisms.  This would indicate that 69.5% of the population registered 
to vote and thus believe it is an effective system.   
                                                 
104 Dislike of elected leaders is evident in polling but can easily be misinterpreted as a dislike of the 
government system.  Polls were valuable in this analysis but must be used carefully to cull out the popular 
dissatisfaction with politicians or issues of the day in order to decipher the state of government sub 
equilibrium. 
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The percentage of registered Americans also closely matches polling data which 
reflects a majority of Americans voters believe that “voting gives me some say about how 
the government runs things.”  In 1999, 73% of respondents agreed with this statement.105  
This indicates that a high percentage of the system believes the electoral system works.     
The change in approval/popularity ratings for multiple government agencies over 
time may also demonstrate an overall system value shift in relation to the governmental 
environment.  A comparison of pre and post 9/11 popularity ratings for multiple 
government mechanisms, may reveal the impact of terrorism on the government sub 
equilibrium.  President Bush has been in office prior to, during, and after the attacks so 
the change in his approval ratings offers some interesting data.   In February 2001 53 % 
of respondents approved of his “handling his job as President.”  The President is only one 
mechanisms of government (and always a polarizing one) so the use of multiple 
government mechanism is useful.  A less polarizing government mechanism is the 
military.  In July of 2001, 6 weeks before 9/11, 81% of the population had a favorable 
opinion of the military.  The combination of these two data points indicates a general 
governmental value-environment balance prior to 9/11.     
Aside from the day to day disagreement in politics, a 1999 Pew survey found that 
only 3% of those surveyed stated that they “never trust the government in Washington to 
do what is right.”  This leaves a staggering 97% of the population that believes the 
government will “only sometimes, most of the time, or just about always” do what is 
right.     
The above data indicates an equalized government sub equilibrium.  This 
assertion may seem counterintuitive given the venomous bi partisan politics, conflict 
generating media, and seemingly fragmented popular attitudes of our time.  However, 
based on system characteristics discussed throughout this thesis; these seemingly chaotic 
and dysfunctional individual and group level indicators are actually a healthy sign of a 
flexible, open, living system.  So although popular opinion seems to indicate there is 
distrust of politicians and specific issues, our collective value overwhelmingly believes in 
                                                 
105 The Pew Research Center, 82.  
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the government environment.  The American government environment is generally 
equalized with governmental values.  Table 5 summarizes the data used to make the 
equilibrium assessment.   Initial pre 9/11 government equilibrium is assessed as 70.106   
 
Table 5.   Pre 9/11 Government Equilibrium Assessment 
Gov EQ Data  Overall Pre 9/11 Assessment of 
Government EQ 
69% Registered to Vote 
73% Positive Poll Data on 
Electoral Process 
53% Presidential Approval 
Rating 
81% Military Approval rating  
 
 
70% Average Approval Rating Across 
Different Government Mechanisms 
 
With that baseline established, was Al Qaeda successful in disrupting that 
equilibrium? 
3.  Immediate Impact of 9/11 on Government Sub-Equilibrium.  The 
attacks of 9/11 took everyone, too include the government by surprise.  The timing 
immediately after 9/11 was critical, government action or inaction could have pushed the 
system towards disequilibrium.  Immediately after the attacks, questions arose as to the 
government culpability in its failure to prevent the attacks.  These questions became a 
major political issue that had potential to disrupt the value-environment relationship but 
eventually did little to disequalize the government sub equilibrium.   
Actions by the government immediately after the attacks were critical to the 
restoration of system normalcy and ultimately to government value-environment balance.  
The government worked swiftly to organize federal assistance that minimized impact on 
                                                 
106 The average of this data was approximately 70%.  This indicated a 70% public approval rating 
across several different mechanisms of government.     
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the system and prevented future disruptive inputs.  An October 2001 poll provides 
evidence that the government response was effective.  This poll reports that 84% of 
respondents agreed that the government was doing a fairly or very well job in reducing 
the threat of terrorism.  Only 11% of those asked believed the government was not doing 
well.107  Some of the government responses to 9/11 are examined here.   
Immediately after the attack, the government conducted massive immigration 
sweeps eventually detaining 768 aliens as “special interest” violators.108  Many of these 
violators were deported and six were actually found to be linked to terrorist groups.  An 
Al Qaeda operative also stated that these immediate actions served to limit Al Qaeda 
movement in the United States.109  Although some at the individual and group level saw 
these as counter productive, these actions were seen by the majority of the system as a 
sign of strong action.  The impression of progress against potential 9/11 conspirators had 
an equalizing effect on the system, regardless of its actual tactical successes.  
Collectively, there was a realization after 9/11 that some personal freedom is inherently 
relinquished to the government for collective security.   
From a practical stand point, there were holes in the government system that 
allowed the attacks to occur.  The government took immediate steps to close some of 
those gaps.  Less than a week after the attack, draft legislation was circulating that would 
eventually become the USA PATRIOT Act.  It gave the government expanded powers to 
investigate and detain potential terrorists.  Its most immediate function was to facilitate 
information sharing between law enforcement and the intelligence community.  Another 
immediate government action was the development of the White House Homeland 
                                                 
107 The Pew Research Center; For the People and The Press, Trends in Political Values and Core 
Attitudes: 1987-2007 (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2007), 110. 
108 Issues such as these “special interest detainees” and the USA PATRIOT Act are examples of 
government programs or counter inputs that may initially have an equalizing effect but later become 
disequalizing.  Initial action by the government was seen as strength but later may be reinterpreted as 
illegitimate activity.  This paper argues that government actions led to an increase in government 
equilibrium which helped to buoy decreases in other sub equilibriums.  However, as time passes and the 
initial action or policies of the government are more closely examined, the support for these policies can 
decrease.  The policy of detainees and the PATRIOT Act are examples.   
109 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2004), 328. 
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Security Council and staffing of the Office of Homeland Security.  It was recognized that 
homeland security as a system mechanism was too diffuse and complicated to handle 
without a single governing body.  This office was to later become the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  As discussed in Chapter IV, the system recognized its own 
deficiency, an outdated control mechanism, and adjusted.  This homeostatic process was 
a direct response to exogenous Al Qaeda inputs.  Critics argue that DHS is a flawed or 
unnecessary organization but its creation had an equalizing effect.  Like most living 
organisms it will evolve and probably become more effective over time.  
Finally, the most notable system reaction was the United States invasion of 
Afghanistan. Combat operations commenced in Afghanistan on 7 October to hunt down 
Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power.  This was a system exogenous output to 
prevent/limit future Al Qaeda inputs to our system.  Within our system, it had a positive 
effect.  The invasion was overwhelmingly supported.    
While there was certainly blame that the government had made mistakes prior to 
9/11, the immediate effect was a wave of national unity and support for the government.     
Presidential approval ratings surged after 9/11 to almost 90% and by February 2002 were 
still at 78%.  This was an overall increase of 25% from 2000.  Overall, in 2001 57% of 
respondents agreed that they were “satisfied with the way things are going in this 
country” up 6% from the year prior.  In the context of 9/11 this is an important statistic.  
After the worst terrorist attack in history, and amid accusation of government complicity, 
the system was more satisfied with its environment than the year prior.  The immediate 
impact on government value-environment equilibrium may have had the opposite effect 
than Al Qaeda intended… it improved.  For assessment purposes, we assess the 
government equilibrium as increasing by 10% to a total of 80 during the immediate 





Table 6.   9/11 Government Equilibrium Assessment   
Gov EQ Data  9/11 Assessment of Government EQ 
84% Approval of Government 
Counterterrorism Efforts 
+6% Increase on Positive 
Survey Data   
78%-90% Presidential 
Approval Rating 




80% Average Approval Rating Across 
Different Government Mechanisms 
 
The immediate impact of 9/11 on the systems government did not create 
disequilibrium; it decreased it by 10%.110  The normal mechanisms of government 
reacted appropriately to the system shock and thus had the effect of reinforcing system 
support for its government.  This sub equilibrium significantly added to the overall 
system stability.  The next question is whether that positive effect lasted or was it 
temporary?   
4.  Lasting Effects on Government Sub-Equilibrium.  The government sub 
system responded as the DETT hypothesis argues.  9/11 was an input that changed the 
environment.  That change created an immediate value-environment imbalance that was 
acted upon because of the characteristic of dynamic equilibrium.  This characteristic 
normally dictates change directed toward system equilibrium.  In response to 9/11, the 
government sub equilibrium was increased.  However, this analysis shows some signs 
that changes which initially led to greater equilibrium have a diminishing return and may 
lead to some increase in disequilibrium over the long term.    
 
                                                 
110 This assessment is based on the overall increase in all indicators examined.  Polling data indicated 
an increase in approval in all government areas; Presidential and military approval rating went up.  A direct 
empirical correlation can not be supplied here as the survey and poll data used to determine pre and 
immediate 9/11 effects are different.  However, all indicators examined immediately after 9/11 increased 
by at least 10%.   
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The creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a massive 
reorganization of the federal government.   It initially included over twenty agencies and 
180,000 employees from disparate corners of government to include the Customs 
Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, 
the Transportation Security Administration and the Border Patrol. It was tasked to 
coordinate homeland security efforts within the federal government and with state and 
local officials and the private sector as well.  The importance of DHS to the system is two 
fold.  First, there is real value in its system function, as an updated control mechanism.111  
System mechanisms get outdated and must be changed or become irrelevant.  Inflexible 
systems that are not capable of this type of internal change can break down and enter 
dangerous disequilibrium.  Second, it illustrates a system governance commitment to 
change and prevention of future attacks.  There were other major government responses 
to 9/11.   
As a result of 9/11, the FBI switched its major focus to counterterrorism.  FBI 
resources were switched away from the law enforcement mission to support its new 
counterterrorism emphasis.  Additionally, on December 8th, 2005 the President created 
the Office of the Director National Intelligence (ODNI).112  The ODNI is intended to 
rectify many bureaucratic challenges with the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
national level intelligence.  As a part of the DNI, the National Counter Terrorism Center 
(NCTC) was created.  Its primary function is to integrate and analyze all intelligence 
pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism.  All of these changes had some practical 
value but there impact on longer term system dynamic equilibrium is unclear.  Using the 
polling data discussed above shows mixed results for longer term impacts on government 
sub equilibrium.   
 
 
                                                 
111 Many critics have argued that DHS was unnecessary and a failure. They offer Hurricane Katrina 
response as evidence.   
112 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ODNI History,” 
http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/history.htm (accessed 11 October 2007). 
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Prior to 9/11, voting and election data was a good indicator of trust or belief in the 
systems ability to self regulate.  This trend increases after 9/11.  All electoral indicators 
continue to rise into the 2004 elections.  Agents within the system vote because they 
desire change and believe the existing system will work.  Figure 15 shows the trends in 
four different voting indicators toward increased belief in the system.  Registered voters, 
total percentage of voters, total percentage of registered voters who voted, and polling 
data all increased.  We can infer from this that one impact of 9/11 was a stronger belief 
that the internal mechanism of government will work to create change.   
 
 
Figure 15.   Voting and Poll Data Pre/11 through 2004 
Although this data indicates an increased value-environment relationship for the 
electoral mechanisms of government, other data indicates a general decline in confidence 
for government sub systems.  Public approval ratings for the President and the military 
dropped since their peak after 9/11.  As of 2003, before the invasion of Iraq, the 
Presidential approval rating was still strong and the military approval rating was still 
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excellent but both had decreased.113  This decrease may indicate a slight but increasing 
imbalance in the government sub equilibrium.  Figure 16 shows graphically the post 9/11 
spike of approval for both government mechanisms and then a return to almost identical 
pre 9/11 levels.  We can hypothesize that an increase in government sub equilibrium 
occurred after 9/11 but is reversing itself as time passes.  In this case, terrorism may have 




                                                 
113 The approval rating of President Bush is a contentious issue but if compared to other Presidential 
approval ratings throughout history, was high in 2003.  Even today, his approval ratings have not dipped to 
the depths of President Carter or Nixon.  Military approval ratings are still superb and indicate strong value 
support for certain government mechanisms.   
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Figure 16.   Presidential and Military Approval Ratings  
Although this indicated a downward trend, Post 9/11 absolute mistrust of the 
government system is still amazingly low.  Figure 17 illustrates the slightest increase in 
pure government mistrust.  This change is extremely low but does illustrate that at least 
4% of the population does not agree the government environment matches value 
expectations.  Alone, this rise may be insignificant but combined with the other indicators 
may indicate an increase in disequilibrium.  Still, the important take away from this data 
is that after a major crisis, 96% of the system still expects the government to at least 
sometimes do what is right.  It appears that the sub equilibrium is well balance but in a 
slow and steady drift away from equilibrium.  One final government data set will add to 




Figure 17.   Government Distrust 
Since October 2001, the Pew Center has been asking the important question 
“How well do you think the government is doing to reduce the threat of terrorism?”  
Figure 18 illustrates that only weeks after the 9/11 attacks, 86% of respondents felt that 
the government was doing either fairly well or very well.  Some of this positive response 
may be a result of increased unity and patriotism after the attack.  The specific percentage 
is not as important as the changes visible in the chart below.  The response to this 
question steadily declined until it hit 69% in November of 2002.   
 
   
Figure 18.   Government Progress to Reduce Terrorism 
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 There were no additional domestic attacks against our system during that period.  
Therefore, we can posit that it was a combination of government policy inputs and a 
change in popular beliefs (value) that caused this decrease in value-environment balance.  
No additional polling data was available until August 2003.  The invasion of Iraq began 
in Feb 2003 so the Aug 2003 data point is not being considered here for purposes of 
deciphering the impact of 9/11 on equilibrium but is interesting to note that it contributed 
to a positive upturn.   
 Overall, these indicators suggest a decrease in government sub equilibrium.  
Based on this data, government equilibrium for purposes of this analysis is assessed to 
have decreased by 10%.114  This cancels out the post 9/11 gains and leaves the system at 
the approximate level of equilibrium as pre 9/11 
 5.  Impact of 9/11 on Government Sub-Equilibrium.  Overall, this analysis 
indicates an immediate move towards greater equilibrium immediately after 9/11 but a 
gradual increase in disequilibrium as time passed.  The government sub equilibrium is not 
a measure of specific issues but instead a balance between the systems governmental 
value component and the governmental environment.  In practical terms, it is a measure 
of how well the system components agree with the state and actions of government.  This 
assessment is more about what the government is and how it acts on a much broader scale 
than just disagreement over specific issues.  Overall, the government sub equilibrium is 
strongly equalized but as of 2003/2004 was experiencing a downward spell.  9/11 did not 
have drastic negative effects on the system but may have been the catalyst for a more 
gradual long term downward trend.  This is important to consider in relation to Al 
Qaeda’s’ strategic, long term outlook.     
                                                 
114 This assessment is based on a return to pre 9/11 Presidential and military approval ratings, a 
decline in overall poll data by Nov 2002 that shows a 17% decrease in popular support for government 
counterterrorism efforts, but also a marginal increase in electoral confidence.  The assessment of a 10% 
drop is subjective but well founded when data trend lines from multiple government mechanism are 
observed.     
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E. NATIONAL SECURITY SUB EQUILIBRUIM 
1.  National Security Sub Equilibrium. This analysis treats the system's 
government and national security sub equilibrium differently.  This section will assess 
whether Al Qaeda was successful in creating some level of disequilibrium between the 
system’s national security value and the national security environment.  Creating 
imbalance in this sub equilibrium could translate to changes in national security policy.  
Based on DETT, Al Qaeda has the ability to change American national security policy by 
making terrorist inputs to our system if they are successful in creating a value-
environment imbalance.   
This section does not use polling data to gauge the state of national security 
equilibrium.  9/11 essentially redefined modern national security.  Any polling data prior 
to 9/11 would not reflect this change in a respondent’s concept of what encompassed 
national security and therefore would not make for an accurate comparison.    
2.  Pre 9/11 National Security Sub Equilibrium.  Pre 9/11 national security 
was largely focused on attacks against our overseas interests.   Due to our superpower 
status, American national security was largely foreign activity to protect the system 
outside its geographic borders.  This included economic, diplomatic and sometimes the 
use force to protect or further national interests.  The major national security issues prior 
to 9/11 were containment of Saddam Hussein, nuclear proliferation in North Korea, and 
supporting the counter narcotic initiatives in Colombia.  Terrorism was a national 
security issue but focused almost exclusively overseas.  Foreign bases, embassies, and a 
warship had been the predominant terrorist target up until 2001.  This was the most 
significant belief change of 9/11.  National security on 10 September was significantly 





Since the concept of national security was largely redefined, no empirical baseline 
can be easily assessed for later comparison.  Therefore, an “average” equilibrium rating 
of 70 was assigned as a baseline for comparison.  This value was assessed to show 
numerical change.115   
3.  Immediate Impact of 9/11 on National Security Sub Equilibrium.  On 
9/11, we were shocked to find that our geographic borders no longer protected us.  9/11 
demonstrated that a group of religious radicals could use rudimentary tools to create 
significant domestic destruction.  They had lived among us and used our own aircraft to 
attack three edifices of national strength.  They had no air force, no armor divisions, and 
no known means of state warfare and yet they successfully killed over 3,000 people and 
brought the system to a halt for a few days.  The pause we all felt on that day was the 
result of this momentary disequilibrium.  Our collective concept of national security did 
not match the environment we lived in.  This sub equilibrium went into immediate 
disequilibrium but was thankfully confined to single sub equilibrium and thus did not 
imbalance the entire system.  The established mechanisms of national security had failed 
and were not sufficient to restore immediate balance.  Our national security tools, 
policies, and 10 September practices were nearly irrelevant in the face of this new 
environment.  Immediate systemic changes were needed to restore national security 
equilibrium.  Since the national security system failed to work it is assessed a value of 
1.116  The specific value assessment is not as important as recognizing that equilibrium in 
this sub component was drastically reduced by 9/11.     
The larger system response also included a values change that recognized national 
security now meant homeland security.  The government reorganization of national 
security apparatuses and the invasion of Afghanistan were both results of this value shift.   
                                                 
115 The value 70 has no empirical grounding.  This is a subjective rating based on the analyst’s own 
experiences.  A value of 70 was chosen as an average number but has no meaning beyond implying that 
70% of the population was satisfied with the national security environment pre 9/11.   
116 A more definitive quantitative study may not access a rating of 1 but is done here to indicate strong 
if not absolute value-environment break even if for short period of time.  Additionally, it is done to chart 
the impact of a seriously deficient score and its impact on other, only moderately disequalized scores.  
Without data comparison to prove the assertion, it is simply fair to say there was a significant downward 
trend in system belief that the new national security sub system environment was acceptable.    
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4.  Lasting Effects on National Security Sub-Equilibrium.  Our failure to 
embrace this change in environment with a corresponding value shift prior to 9/11 
seceded both physical and ideological ground to our opponents.  9/11 was an input that 
created a value-environment imbalance in the national security equilibrium so severe that 
it could not self regulate.  The larger system was needed to make organization, function, 
and belief changes to restore it as a functioning sub system.  
Immediately after 9/11 this sub equilibrium balance was restored and we 
redefined national security.  The short term impacts of our national security changes were 
beneficial, as indicated throughout this chapter.  However, the long term impact of these 
changes is still unknown.  As of 2007 we have yet to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden, 
we invaded another nation state at the expense of finishing the job in Afghanistan, we are 
pursuing high dollar weaponry such as the F22, Joint Strike Fighters, a larger blue water 
navy, and repositioning forces in and around the Pacific.  These indicators would suggest 
we are moving backwards into a pre 9/11 national security mindset.   
5.  Effects on National Security Sub-Equilibrium.  The immediate impact 
of 9/11 on this sub equilibrium was drastic.  9/11 shocked the national security sub 
system because the reality of 9/11 clashed with how we viewed the world on 9/10.  With 
the multitude of changes came a re equalization of this sub equilibrium.  Table 7 below 
lists the assessed values for the national security equilibrium.  Post 9/11 national security 




                                                 
117 As discussed, the initial variable of 70 was assigned only for comparison.  After 9/11 a complete 
failure in national security process to protect its citizenry resulted in disequilibrium.  A post 9/11 
assessment of 60 was assessed for two reasons.  The system did rebound and in particular, strong domestic 
security action detailed here went a long way to reassure the public that the national security system was 
again functioning and the invasion of Afghanistan did have a practical impact of disrupting Al Qaeda 
operations that resulted in no additional domestic attacks up until the end of this assessment period.  The 
assessment of 60 is not founded in a direct translation of data (polling or otherwise), but instead a fair 
assessment of public and thus system perception. 
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Table 7.   National Security Assessment  
Phase Value 
(V) 
Equilibrium (EQ) Disequilibrium 
(DEQ) 
 1-100 % Environment 
which equals Value 
(EQ=V/E) 
 
Pre 9/11 70 .70 .30 
9/11 80 .01 .99 
Post 9/11 60 .60 .40 
 
Well into 2002 and 2003 there is significant national debate about the threat and 
the particulars of our new national security but it is relatively equalized.  This momentary 
disequilibrium brought about many changes whose long term impacts are yet unclear.               
F.  9/11’S IMPACT ON SYSTEM  
On 9/11 the country paused.  We can all recall the moment when the attack 
occurred and how we felt when we realized what had happened.  The system was 
shocked.  Although most of us were no where near the damage and not in any physical 
danger, the events clashed sharply with how we perceived the world.  As individuals we 
were busy with emergency response, erecting a hasty defense, or simply glued to the 
news but without our knowing it; the system slowed, changed, and then resumed normal 
operations.  9/11 demonstrated that America is a remarkably equalized value-
environment system.  Change and fragmented values are inherent in the system but 
because of its flexibility and direct value feedback loop to the government, it proved to be 
remarkably equalized and responsive to disruption.   
As we were glued to activities in New York, a field in Pennsylvania, and the 
Pentagon the system decreased in equilibrium but never entered true disequilibrium.  This 
change in equilibrium spurred changes throughout the system; from individual concepts 
of national security, economic policy, to major government redesigns.  The pace of  
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equilibrium decline was also a factor.  It was not a slow steady fall.  It was a drastic drop 
that shocked the system.  The quantitative assessment of these equilibrium shifts has been 
plotted on a graph at Figure 19.   
The economic equilibrium initially dropped but counter inputs began to slowly 
halt the increase in disequilibrium and start the move towards balance.  The empiric 
assessment of the economic equilibrium before, during and after the crisis was 90, 80, 
and 85.118  The government sub equilibrium was actually increased.   Indicators show 
that a change in American values actually increased this equilibrium after 9/11.  
Government approval ratings and levels of patriotism were amazing although the 
population had much to blame its government for.  However, this honeymoon was short 
lived and this equilibrium began loosing value sometime in 2002/2003.  The quantitative 
assessment was rated as 70, 80, and 70.119  The overall drop in dynamic equilibrium was 
significant but only the national security sub equilibrium reached a level even close to 
disequilibrium.  On 9/10 we believed the country was safe but instead we were proven to 
be vulnerable.  9/11 was a demonstration of capability and was followed by Al Qaeda 
promises of future attacks.  Both of these inputs were at odds with how we believed 
national security should be.   This analysis assessed that national security equilibrium 
prior to 9/11 was 70 but then dipped into disequilibrium which required major structural 
and functional changes to resolve.  These changes resulted in a return of equilibrium to 
60. 
                                                 
118 The particular method and data used to derive these assessments is detailed in the economic 
equilibrium section.  This section of the analysis will deal with the graphing and overall analysis of total 
system change.    
119 The particular method and data used to derive these assessments is detailed in the government 
equilibrium section.   
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Figure 19.   Sub Equilibrium Quantitative Assessment 
The three analyzed sub equilibriums combine to form the larger system 
equilibrium.  The total equilibrium was calculated by combining the three sub 
equilibrium at each phase as graphed at Figure 20.  Pre 9/11 the average of economic, 
government and national security equilibrium results in a total equilibrium assessment of 
77.120  Immediately after 9/11, the average of the three sub equilibriums dipped to a low 
of 53.  This assessment is heavily influenced by the assessment of disequilibrium within 
the national security sub equilibrium.   The actual size of the dip is not as important to 
this thesis’ question as the indication that there is a significant drop followed by 
significant social system changes.  Throughout the process of these changes, a significant 
equilibrium rebound occurs.  This total assessed rebound returns to a post 9/11 
equilibrium assessment of 71.  Economic data indicated a strong return to normalcy.  
Government indicators and poll show a return to almost identical pre 9/11 levels. As 
discussed above, the national security assessment of equilibrium was subjective but based 
on anecdotal evidence was assessed to have recovered to a 60.   Most indicators 
                                                 
120 Although the method to achieve this rating requires refinement for anything other than a general 
understanding and track of equilibrium, this number seems remarkably close to what you would expect.  
This assessment would indicate that 77% of the U.S. system on 10 September 2001 believed that its 
environment matched its values.     
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Figure 20.   Impact of 9/11 on American Social System Equilibrium  
The Iraq invasion in March of 2003 makes determining the long term impact of 
9/11 and its responses a challenge that cannot be adequately addressed in this thesis.  
However, based on anecdotal evidence, Figure 8 includes a final data set of where we 
may be today.  It is realistic to assume from the general national mood that all three of the 
sub equilibriums studied in this section have fallen.   
This chapter attempted to measure and analyzes three system sub equilibriums to 
determine overall system equilibrium.  These equilibriums were assigned a numeric value 
for purposes of charting their behavior over time.  The actual assessments of equilibrium 
value were mostly based on data trends but the actual numerical assessment was not 
derived from a standard formula.  These assessments were not intended to be definitive 
but only used to chart the general state of equilibrium.     
The input of 9/11 was met with a pause and then a series of immediate and 
measured counter inputs that successfully moved the system back towards equilibrium.  
The system changed the environment and values.  The government stressed that 
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additional attacks were imminent, thus inoculating the population in order to better 
absorb future attacks.  It also took simultaneous actions to defend against future attacks 
and go after the exogenous actors.  The American system was sufficiently flexible to 
absorb the value-environment mismatch and work to restore dynamic equilibrium.  This 
process initially improved some sub equilibriums, improving the value-environment 
agreement to levels greater than 9/11.  Most of these gains were short lived as most 
returned to or below pre 9/11 levels.  Al Qaeda was successful at creating change.  The 
long term success of this attack is not yet known and will continue to play out over time 
but significant changes occurred and the current equilibrium is lower that it was on 10 
September 2001.  Thiers is a long term war, measured by inches and they are willing to 
wait.                
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
A. ORGANIZATION 
This final chapter includes a summary of ideas and final thoughts regarding this 
thesis’ primary question.  An answer to the prolific question of how terrorism works has 
been offered in this thesis and will be concluded in this final chapter.  This conclusion 
reviews three main topics; Al Qaeda, terrorism theory, and the dynamic equilibrium 
theory of terrorism.  This conclusion also includes a short discussion of existing 
counterarguments, areas for future research, and policy implications. 
B. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1.  Al Qaeda.  9/11 served as a wake-up call, but cost the United States 3,043 
dead in the process.  Prior to that day, we had little understanding of Al Qaeda or what 
they wanted to achieve. Since then we have a much better understanding of the enemy 
and their objectives but still struggle to understand how terrorism may or may not help 
them achieve those objectives.   
We now know that hard line Al Qaeda members will stop at nothing to achieve 
their objectives.  We also know that Al Qaeda is not just a terrorist group; it is the 
vanguard of a global Islamist insurgency bent on social, political, and religious change.  
These insurgents are targeting us, in part, because our country and its policies are an 
obstacle to their goals.    
Al Qaeda is a violent predatory system bound together by a core ideology in 
pursuit of a unified objective.  Viewing Al Qaeda as a system can help us to understand 
its lifecycle of growth, maturation, operation, and ultimately death.  This system outputs 
violence and radical Islamist ideology.  These deadly outputs are not arbitrary but instead 
focused on achieving strategic goals that include nothing short of total social-religious 
change.  They intend to implement global Salafist rule and will kill or be killed to achieve 
this objective.  The first phase of their campaign was regional (the “near enemy”) but 
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includes attacks against America (the “far enemy”).  They hope to coerce American 
policy in the Middle East primarily by disrupting our economy.  They expect by attacking 
our economic interests, the American population will demand a complete withdrawal 
from the Middle East.  9/11 demonstrated that they are more capable of achieving this 
objective than any western expert could have postulated.   
Given this situation; a clear understanding of their system, objectives, and 
methods are critical to our success in defeating them.  Al Qaeda’s primary tactic to 
achieve their strategic objective is the use of terrorism.     
2.  Terrorism.  Significant time, energy, and resources have been devoted to 
understanding terrorism.  Unfortunately, there are still many important questions 
unanswered.  This thesis’ primary question was how terrorism works, and the thesis 
attempted to answer this question through the use of social system equilibrium theory.  
The thesis builds on a body of previous research and theory.  
Much of this existing theory explains terrorism as an illegal use, or threat, of 
violence to coerce political change.  Terrorism generates fear and is thus inherently 
coercive.  Our response to terrorism is often based on a fear of future attacks.  Terrorism 
generates fear far beyond its immediate victims.  It is a communicative tool in which a 
single attack can simultaneously serve the specific act of destruction, coerce a target 
audience, and act to propagate a message.  It is “performance violence” because of its 
often symbolic, dramatic, and theatrical nature.121  As both theater and communication, 
these violent dramas are intended to attack the popular sense of normalcy and morality.  
In some cases, the physical destruction caused by terrorism is of secondary importance to 
the message it sends.    
Like other means of warfare, the form and purpose of terrorism has evolved.  
Historically, terrorism has evolved in waves intimately linked to the political and social 
situation of its time.122  These waves of terrorism assumed a personality based on the 
politics and technology of the period.  As the social political and technological landscape 
                                                 
121 Juergensmeyer, 127. 
122 Rapoport, 46-73. 
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changed, violent activists adapted the use and means of terrorism to keep it effective.  We 
cannot defeat or destroy terrorism but we can make it an ineffective tactic and thus 
significantly limit its use.  Current theory offers us little if we hope to move in this 
direction.    
Current theory does offer explanations of how terrorism works amongst specific 
groups, countries, and within specific conflicts but a broader more holistic explanation of 
terrorism is missing.  Systems theory has been used with some success towards this larger 
explanation and was adopted throughout this thesis.  This thesis endeavored to explain 
how terrorism works at the system level and thus facilitate an understanding of its use 
across different environments, various situations, and over long periods of time.  This 
level of terrorism understanding is the first step to making it an obsolete weapon.  The 
dynamic equilibrium theory of terrorism offered in this thesis is a step towards this 
objective.  Only after we understand the broader theoretical problem of terrorism can we 
begin to defeat it or mitigate its use in a meaningful strategic way.   
3.  Dynamic Equilibrium Theory of Terrorism (DETT).  DETT is a 
framework for understanding how terrorism works.  Terrorism is a unique political 
weapon because it targets a social system’s equilibrium in order to force change. 
Since DETT is rooted in system and sociology theory, this thesis spent significant 
time exploring existing ideas in these different fields of study in order to lay the ground 
work upon which DETT is formulated.  Terrorist groups and societies were examined as 
systems.  Understanding terrorist groups as systems can help identify how they operate 
and thus how to more effectively fight them.  Examining society as a system is also 
necessary to understand how terrorism works to stimulate social change.      
Society was analyzed as a complex living system.  A simple yet instructive social 
system model was adopted that views society as consisting of two primary components; 
value and environment.  The environment consists of all physical elements of the system 
while the value component includes the mental and emotional components.  These two 
primary components exist in a homeostatic balance.  Like all living systems, society is 
characterized by openness and dynamic equilibrium. 
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This thesis described dynamic equilibrium as the inherent characteristic of social 
systems to balance the value and environment components of the system.  This 
homeostatic process keeps the system functioning at a normal level.  Fluctuations in this 
balance are normal and healthy as long as they stay within a certain operating range.    
Although their particulars differ, all living systems are subject to this balance of 
forces or property of dynamic equilibrium.  This process is necessary to manage the 
constant input of energy necessary to battle entropy and thus sustain life.  Due to this 
process, social systems are characterized by constant change, imbalance, change, and 
balance.  Due to this homeostatic process, disruptions in equilibrium tend to stimulate 
changes that are intended to restore balance.  This is a normal process but can be induced 
for nefarious purposes.      
We discussed true equilibrium as a complete parity of forces which is not possible 
in its truest sense.  We used the term equilibrium to describe a continuum of balance.  
The term disequilibrium is used in this thesis to represent some move towards imbalance, 
a trend towards disequilibrium while not necessarily meaning a complete imbalance or 
true disequilibrium.  Disequilibrium is a state of extreme value-environment imbalance 
that can not be regulated by the existing mechanisms of a social system.   
As an open system, society is subject to both exogenous and endogenous inputs.  
The normal functioning of a social system includes this routine and constant reception 
and processing of internal and external inputs.  Most of these inputs are routine and lead 
to a constant but peaceful input-balance process.  This process of dynamic equilibrium is 
how societies change.  Governments and politics are system mechanisms created to 
control this process and the overall maintenance of the system.     
This thesis highlighted that change via this normal process tends to be slow, 
measured, and can be thought of as social evolution.  Each system is unique and its 
mechanisms that handle the process of change are different.  Some systems are very open 
while others are relatively closed.  Some systems are extremely flexible and others are 
more fragile.  Likewise, some systems can handle many inputs and process them quickly 
while others may become easily overwhelmed.  When the process of dynamic 
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equilibrium cannot effectively maintain a balance between the value and environment, 
systems may become dysfunctional.  The closer to disequilibrium a system becomes, the 
more system pressure builds and is exerted to spur change.  The greater the pressure, the 
more likely change will be radical and potentially violent.  When a system ceases to 
function properly and can no longer continue this equalizing process, it is considered to 
be in disequilibrium.     
Therefore, inputs made to the system from outside its boundaries could be aimed 
at specifically disrupting dynamic equilibrium in order to force changes in the system.  
Inputs that disrupt the value-environment relationship could have this effect.  A value 
input that causes a system to disagree with its environment or vice versa would trigger 
change.  Terrorism is one such input. 
DETT hypothesizes that terrorism is a violent input to the environment at 
immediate and recognizable odds with a system’s values and as such decreases the level 
of equilibrium between the two.  When some level of disequilibrium exists, changes 
occur in an effort to restore value-environment equilibrium.  Therefore, DETT posits that 
terrorism has the capacity to induce political/social change by targeting social system 
equilibrium.  Terrorism is a unique form of political violence because it is a violent act 
that clashes sharply with the systems beliefs.  Other forms of violence such as crime or 
protests may be illegal but are not so dramatically at odds with the value component. 
Understanding why defining terrorism has been such a subjective endeavor is now 
easier given this DETT framework.  It is a violent act that is at dramatic odds with a 
system’s value, but in systems with fragmented value components… not all agents of the 
system will see or feel the same disequalizing effect from the act.   
Terrorism is communicative not because of the horrific act of destruction or 
increased media coverage but because the impact on equilibrium reverberates throughout 
the system.  The act of physical destruction is not the primary target, the system 
equilibrium is.  Therefore, terrorism has far reaching effects on the system and its psyche 
than other forms of violence do not.  The wider the audience, the greater the impact will  
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be on the system.  For this reason, increased media attention and the proliferation of 
world wide instantaneous communication have intensified effects of terrorism on both the 
targeted system and adjacent systems.   
Terrorism appears to be increasingly violent and destructive.  If DETT is valid, 
increased violence could be a symptom, not of increasing ferocity, but a hardening of our 
system’s value component.  As our values change overtime, so does the input necessary 
to create a value-environment mismatch.  Violence once thought to be at odds with our 
beliefs is now common place or at least to some degree accepted.  The brutality of 
terrorists may be changing because more drastic and deadly levels of violence are needed 
to elicit a change in dynamic equilibrium.   
If this input of terrorism moves the system too far out of equilibrium, true 
disequilibrium may occur.  A state of true disequilibrium exists when the system cannot 
function using its existing structure or organization to restore normal operations.  In this 
situation, the mechanisms that normally govern change are no longer adequate to 
equalize the system.  If a system recovers from disequilibrium it will result in structural 
or functional changes that create a fundamentally different system.  As the system 
becomes more and more dysfunctional, pressure for change builds.  If balance is not 
restored, more extreme forms of change are likely.  These extreme forms of change will 
most likely include violence and terrorism.  Therefore, terrorism can create 
disequilibrium while disequilibrium is likely to be associated with more terrorism.  It is 
for this reason that terrorism is frequently, if not always associated with revolution.      
Therefore, based on these DETT concepts, government counterterrorism policy 
must be especially mindful of system dynamic equilibrium.  Terrorism creates some 
degree of disequilibrium in an attempt to force change.  Counterterrorism policy therefore 
must not only focus on inhibiting these dangerous inputs but also equalizing the system.  
Counterterrorism policies that serve to stymie the terrorist actor but further the enemy’s 
objectives within our own system are counterproductive and ultimately self defeating. 
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Terrorism works to spur changes in social systems but rarely achieves its intended 
objectives.  The immediate and observable impact of terrorism may lead its users to 
believe it is effective but they also fail to see its use in system terms.  Each system is 
unique and will react to similar inputs of terrorism in very different ways.  This is why 
terrorism may appear to have worked in some conflicts or causes but failed miserably in 
others.  Analysts desperately search for variables among these conflicts that would 
indicate why terrorism achieves such seemingly sporadic success.  The answer to this 
quandary is not in the analysis of terrorism but in the system it targeted.  Ultimately, the 
system as a whole (not just the government mechanism) is in control of its collective 
response to terrorism.  System changes will most likely occur as a result of terrorism but 
only rarely will they be changes that the terrorist desires.   
The system components ultimately control their own response to disequalizing 
inputs.  An understanding of this process and a self awareness of its own value-
environment state can improve its self maintenance.  Although simplistic, the population 
of a democratic society ultimately determines the effect of terrorism.    The terrorist input 
of 9/11 disrupted American system equilibrium and spurred changes throughout the 
system.  This thesis briefly examined the impact on economic, government, and national 
security equilibriums.  The impact on each of these was different but fed into the total 
system equilibrium.  The system was negatively impacted by 9/11 but within a short time 
restored itself to an almost exact pre 9/11 level of value-environment agreement.  
However, since that return of balance, we are seeing a slow but steady decline in the 
system’s equilibrium.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 9/11 was a catalyst for change 
that we corrected but our own responses to 9/11 are now having diminishing returns.     
Terrorism would become an obsolete tactic or strategy of warfare if it was no 
longer capable of eliciting system change.  The initial value-environment shock cannot be 
avoided but the systems response can be.  Consider a future in which acts of terrorism no 
longer work.  Terrorism is deterred because it no longer spurs change.  Imagine a future 
in which an airline hijacking does not cause public fear but instead causes a rush on 
airline tickets the next day.  Hijacking would no longer be a viable tactic.  Envision an 
attack on Wall Street that doesn’t elicit financial panic… but instead a massive rush of 
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investment accompanied by record profits.  Al Qaeda attacks a mall on Saturday and on 
Sunday the malls across America are packed with defiance.  These are system responses 
within our control.  What power would Al Qaeda have to achieve any of its objectives if 
we better understood our own system, its equilibrium, and its response to terror attacks?   
4. Final Thoughts of Policy.  Terrorism theory is an important pursuit but has 
limited practical use unless it is used to develop policy.  The ideas, arguments, and 
analysis presented throughout this thesis have minimal immediate impact for the 
country’s agents, detectives, or soldiers fighting on the front lines of this war.  But the 
tactics, objectives, and strategies of these war fighters should be based in policy, rooted 
in accurate theory.        
DETT can be used as a framework, not necessarily to make immediate decisions 
but to view how terrorism impacts social systems at different levels.  This systems 
approach is most valuable to determine the long term impact of both terrorism and 
counterterrorism policies.  The actual acts of terror do very little damage to the overall 
system.  The real power of terrorism is in our own reaction to it.  Counterterrorism 
policies that create greater disequilibrium than the actual attack are not effective policies.   
C. FLAWS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS  
This thesis was a vehicle to explore certain system, social, and terrorism issues 
but its author fully recognizes there are theoretical and substantive holes throughout.  The 
subject is broad and incorporates a host of specialties and sub specialties that could not be 
wholly explored in the preparation of this document.  That said, an honest effort was 
made to address some of the immediate challenges with an upfront understanding that not 
all counterarguments could be addressed here in this short paper.  The following is a short 
explanation of possible flaws and counterarguments to the ideas expressed in this thesis.    
1.   Closer study of Social Factors, Values, Culture.  This thesis only 
quickly covered some of the social science concepts that could play into the value 
component.  A closer analysis is necessary that examines the larger body of social 
science work in this area.  This could lead to a clearer definition of value using existing 
academic standards and research.  Although the author stands by his classifications of 
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value as a basis for DETT, it is recognized that additional work would be useful 
regarding the notion of a single system value component.   
2.   Defining Equilibrium and Disequilibrium.  Chapter III and IV both 
went to some length to outline the existing theory, definitions and some 
counterarguments against the use of equilibrium theory.  Past debates were immediately 
obvious regarding the use and usefulness of the terms.  Still, the argument that society 
does not exit in a balance or any type of equilibrium (as we have asserted here) is 
acknowledged as a counterargument.  The definitions applied to these terms are critically 
important to a reader’s acceptance of the ideas proffered in this paper.  If the reader 
simply disagrees with these fundamental concepts at the onset, the remainder of this work 
remains on notably shaky ground. 
3.   Value Fragmentation and Conflict Theory.  The notion of a fragmented 
or at least diverse value component was only superficially addressed in this thesis.  It 
acknowledges that diversity is inherent and can lead to conflict within a system.  
However, the author is not completely satisfied with this explanation and feels it is an 
area for additional thought and research.  Although, this work stands by its arguments 
regarding value and conflict theory, it recognizes that there is a much more complex 
relationship between a fragmented value component and conflict (or terrorism) than is 
explored here.  This may be an area for additional study but the central question of this 
thesis was not to address the causes of terrorism; but instead how terrorism impacts 
societies and thus how it works to spur change.   
4.  What is the Practical Application of DETT?  As a student of terrorism 
and a practitioner of combating terrorism policy, the author knows full well that theories 
are only valid if they have some practical value.  DETT and many of the ideas introduced 
in this thesis are abstract and esoteric.  They may seem irrelevant or impractical in a time 
when we are desperately fighting to protect ourselves and hunt down Al Qaeda.  During 
times like this, theory takes a back-seat to putting shooters where and when they need be.  
Progress today is measured in days without an attack, enemy operatives captured/killed, 
and the pace of reconstruction… not in state of equilibrium.  However, policy must start 
somewhere.  Good policy is rooted in good theory about how the world works, not on the 
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conflict of the moment.  Policies that do not consider the larger system are in danger of 
being more harmful than the enemy.  DETT is offered as a framework for academic 
debate and policy rumination, not for those mounting-up for tomorrows patrol.   
D. FUTURE RESEARCH  
1.  Warfare and the Value-Environment Construct.  The author was 
exposed to this construct while studying revolutionary war.  In the research process of 
this thesis, several sources were found to use or eluded to this simple yet powerful 
construct.  However, no specific work was found that explored this notion and war.123  
These seemed to be a powerful and insightful systems approach to the world that has 
implications far beyond terrorism and revolution.  One specific area for future research is 
the impact of these ideas on warfare and interstate conflict.  Although war if often 
accepted in modern society, it tends to be constrained by this value-environment 
relationship.  State war in particular is conducted based on a codified set of values such 
as treaties, international law, laws of war, and rules of engagement.  These constraints are 
presumably based on a system’s values.  When war drifts beyond these system imposed 
limits, accusations of war crimes, unjust war, or even terrorism may arise.  Expanding the 
use of this construct to understand the constraints of war and conflict in general would be 
a useful future project.   
2.   Defining and Measuring Equilibrium.  This thesis made an initial 
attempt to define, measure, and chart the changes in equilibrium after 9/11.   DETT set 
out a basic premise for understanding terrorism and in doing so identified a useful 
approach to measuring equilibrium.  This was done to demonstrate the utility of DETT as 
a mental framework.  Although this was useful, the level and clarity of equilibrium 
analysis was no where near sufficient to begin measuring, tracking, and predicting value-
environment balance in a complete social system. Future research could focus on precise 
metrics for measuring equilibrium.  The first step would be a detailed categorization and 
measurement criteria for both values and environment.  With these measurements in 
                                                 
123 If such a work exists it was not found given the research tools available to the author in the time 
constraints of this short yet intense degree program.    
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place, a more precise equation could be developed to determine changes in equilibrium 
and limits of disequilibrium.  Although difficult, this could prove to be a significant 
advance in multiple fields study.   
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